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THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF A FASHION MONOPOLY                                                                                        
HAOCHEN SUN* 
By focusing on the recent fashion warfare over the red sole used on luxury shoes, 
this Article reconsiders the implications of trademark protection of single color 
marks for regulating the development of the fashion industry and the cultural 
evolution of human society. Courts and commentators have focused on the role of 
the aesthetic functionality doctrine in deciding whether Christian Louboutin’s red 
sole mark should be protected by trademark law. This Article takes a different 
approach. It calls for a social justice–based re-examination of whether the red 
sole mark is distinctive enough to warrant trademark protection.  
Based on a close look at the distinctiveness of the red sole mark, the Article puts 
forward a social justice mandate that should be incorporated into trademark law. 
It contends that social justice should have the trumping power to deny trademark 
protection of marks even if they are adequately distinctive. It also shows how the 
new mandate resonates with the equality-oriented protection under the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments. The Article further addresses practical concerns for 
implementing the mandate and discusses its merit in solving the problems caused 
by the aesthetic functionality doctrine. 
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Fashion is a form of imitation and so of social equalization . . . . It 
unites those of a social class and segregates them from others. 
Georg Simmel1 
In an acquisitive society, the drive for monopoly advantage is a very 
powerful pressure. Unchecked, it would no doubt . . . register the sun 
and the moon as exclusive trade-marks. 
Ralph S. Brown2 
INTRODUCTION 
Fashion is the embodiment of beauty and fantasy. Aesthetically, fashion 
represents the relentless human quest for creative combinations of color, shape, 
                                           
1 Georg Simmel, Fashion, 62 AM . J. SOC. 541, 541 (1957). 
2 Ralph S. Brown, Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 
57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1206 (1948). 
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and material.3 Infusing human creativity with aesthetic imagination, fashion design 
makes men and women look endlessly appealing with the constant emergence of 
new fashion trends.4 But this quest for beauty and fantasy does not come without 
cost. Rather, to stay in fashion, one needs to ceaselessly acquire new items defined 
by the latest fashion trends. In this marketplace, fashion has become a very simple 
idea. It is about money. It is one’s purchasing power that determines whether one 
can be fashionable. Furthermore, designers have acknowledged that having 
business acumen has become crucial for faring well, because fashion has been 
dominated by commercial strategies.5 It is therefore no wonder that the world of 
fashion has become a gigantic industry. It is estimated that the 2012 revenue of the 
fashion industry hit $482.8 billion.6  
With the increasingly rapid commercialization of fashion creativity, 
trademark law has been adapted to provide stronger protection for famous fashion 
brands.7 This is particularly important for the fashion industry because intellectual 
                                           
3 See generally, ROLAND BARTHES, THE FASHION SYSTEM (Matthew Ward & Richard 
Howard trans., University of California Press 1990) (discussing fashion as the embodiment of 
aesthetic signs); see also Alladi Venkatesh et al., The Aesthetics of Luxury Fashion, Body and 
Identify Formation, 20 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 459, 468 (2010) (discussing “aestheticization of 
everyday life through fashion and bodily adornment”). 
4 See WALTER BENJAMIN, SELECTED WRITINGS, VOL. 4, 1938-1940, at 179 (Howard Eiland & 
Michael W. Jennings eds., Edmund Jephcott et al. trans., 2003) (describing fashion as “the 
eternal recurrence of the new.”). 
5 See, e.g., LARS SVENDSEN, FASHION: A PHILOSOPHY 155 (John Irons trans., Reaktion Books 
2006) (stating that the fashion sector “has done well as advertising, but only on rare occasions as 
art.”). Tom Ford recently commented that “[h]igh quality global journalism requires investment. 
Pure creativity, without the thought of commercial viability, is disappearing. There are many 
very creative designers, but the process is now vetted by what will actually sell. That is what is 
necessary to stay competitive in the market.” Wes Gordon, a raising fashion designer star, 
acknowledged that “[t]he days of being purely a creative area dead, but fashion as a business is 
bigger than ever.” Elizabeth Paton, Fashion Cents and Sensibility, FIN. TIMES, (August 19, 
2013), www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/45867618-05e8-11e3-8ed5-00144feab7de.html#
axzz2cUJmTGpo. 
6 See Nikoleta Panteva, Trends Outfitting the Fashion Retail Sector, IBISWORLD (June 
2012), www.ibisworld.com/Common/MediaCenter/Fashion retail special report.pdf; see also, C. 
Scott Hemphill & Jeannie Suk, The Law, Culture, and Economics of Fashion, 61 STAN. L. REV. 
1147, 1148 (2009) (“Fashion is one of the world’s most important creative industries. It is the 
major output of a global business with annual U.S. sales of more than $200 billion—larger than 
those of books, movies, and music combined.”). 
7 KAL RAUSTIALA & CHRISTOPHER SPRIGMAN, THE KNOCKOFF ECONOMY: HOW IMITATION 
SPARKS INNOVATION 5 (2012) (pointing out that “[f]ashion trademarks are fiercely policed”). 
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property law generally does not protect fashion designs,8 except for trademarks 
used to merchandize fashion designs.9 But how far should trademark law go in 
strengthening legal protection of the fashion industry? This issue is now more 
important than ever. Recent years have seen formidable power amassed by some 
rapidly expanding luxury companies,10 which has not only overshadowed certain 
part of the fashion sector11 but has also threatened free speech12 and humanitarian13 
initiatives. 
The scope of trademark protection looms even larger in the wake of the 
recent fashion war waged in the United States by two French luxury fashion 
companies: Christian Louboutin and Yves Saint Laurent.14 The former has made 
                                           
8 See Hemphill & Suk, supra note 6, at 1150 (“Despite being the core of fashion and legally 
protected in Europe, fashion design lacks protection against copying under U.S. intellectual 
property law.”). 
      9 See Susan Scafidi, Intellectual Property and Fashion Design, in 1 INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS 121 (Peter K. Yu ed., 
2006) (pointing out that “[t]he most universally applicable and flexible mechanism for the 
protection of fashion design is trademark law” and thus trademark protection “creates an 
interesting incentive for fashion houses….”); Jeannie Suk, Little Red (Litigious) Shoes, N.Y. 
TIMES, January 21, 2012, at SR14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/ 
22/opinion/sunday/louboutin-and-the-little-red-litigious-shoes.html?_r=0 (“The law does not 
protect fashion design, but it does recognize the rights inherent in branding.”). 
10 With a series of high-profile mergers and acquisitions, the luxury industry has three major 
global conglomerates: Kering, Louis Vuitton Moët Hennessy (LVMH), Compagnie Financière 
Richemont SA (Richemont).  
11 For example, the French stock market regulator imposed an €8 million fine on LVMH for 
the “seriousness of the successive breaches of public disclosure requirements, which consisted in 
concealing each stage of LVMH’s stakebuilding in Hermès.” Scheherazade Daneshkhu, Luxury: 
Object of Desire, FIN. TIMES (July 8, 2013), available at www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/bc275cea-
e7ae-11e2-9aad-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2csGDaKCb. 
12 See e.g., Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, 507 F.3d 252 (4th Cir. 2007); 
see also, Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 868 F. Supp. 2d 172 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
13 See, e.g., Benjamin Sutton, Artist Wins Copyright Case Brought By Louis Vuitton, L MAG. 
(May 6, 2011), www.thelmagazine.com/TheMeasure/archives/2011/05/06/artist-wins-copyright-
case-brought-by-louis-vuitton; Parody or Trademark Infringement?: Louis Vuitton v. Penn Law, 
TRADEMARKS & BRANDS (March 12, 2012), www.trademarksandbrands.com 
/2012/03/12/parody-or-trademark-infringement-louis-vuitton-v-penn-law/. 
14 Christian Louboutin S.A. v Yves Saint Laurent Am., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011) (Louboutin I); Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holdings, Inc., 696 
F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 2012) (Louboutin II); see also Ray A. Smith and Ashby Jones, Color Wars: 
Luxury Makers Battle Over Red-Soled Shoe, WALL ST. J. (August 11, 2011), 
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the red sole the iconic design feature of its women’s footwear. During this fashion 
war, Christian Louboutin asserted that it should have complete “territorial” control 
of the red sole, to be landmarked by flags of trademark protection.15 
By focusing on this fashion warfare, this article opens a perspective on the 
ramifications of the trademarkability of the red sole for the role of trademark law 
in regulating the development of the fashion industry and the cultural evolution of 
human society. It argues that we should reconsider whether Louboutin’s red sole 
mark is distinctive enough to warrant trademark protection.16 The article proposes 
that this issue must be examined from the social justice perspective. It contends 
that social justice should have the trumping power to deny trademark protection of 
the red sole mark even if it is adequately distinctive.17  
A closer look at the concept of trademark distinctiveness, as this article 
shows, sheds new light on whether single color marks like the red sole mark merit 
trademark protection. Since the Louboutin litigation, commentators have 
overwhelmingly focused on the role of the aesthetic functionality doctrine in 
deciding the trademarkability of single color marks.18 Indeed, the courts that 
decided the Louboutin cases focused heavily on the aesthetic functionality 
doctrine.19 This focus, however, may have led both commentators and the courts to 
take for granted that the Louboutin red sole mark is adequately distinctive.20  
By contrast, paying greater consideration to the concept of trademark 
distinctiveness will reveal that the Louboutin red sole mark may not be adequately 
distinctive to warrant trademark protection. This conclusion carries very far-
                                                                                                                                        
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904823804576500190678090656.html; Alison 
Frankel, Louboutin Red-Sole Trademark Case: Color War at the 2nd Circuit, REUTERS (Jan. 6, 
2012), blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2012/01/06/louboutin-red-sole-trademark-case-color-
war-at-the-2nd-circuit/. 
15 See Suk, supra note 9 (“Louboutin’s claim spotlights the pressure on fashion designers to 
frame their aesthetic choices as brand identifiers, and the legal contortions that result.”). 
16 See infra Part II.B. 
17 See infra Part III.A. 
18 See, e.g., Margot E. Parmenter, Louboutins and Legal Loopholes: Aesthetic Functionality 
and Fashion, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1039 (2013); Suk, supra note 9, (cautioning that “if the color is a 
useful feature in a product — green for farm equipment or yellow for banana-flavored gum — it 
can’t be a trademark, even if it is source-identifying, because excluding competitors from a 
useful feature would be anti-competitive”).  
19 See infra Part I.B. 
20 See infra Part II.B. 
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reaching implications. The red sole warfare is still raging in the fashion arena. In 
the United States, after its litigation against YSL, Christian Louboutin commenced 
action against other fashion companies that marketed red-sole shoes.21 In Europe, 
Christian Louboutin launched similar legal actions against Zara22 and Van Haren,23 
two fast fashion companies that have also marketed red-sole shoes. The fashion 
world still awaits a final answer as to whether Christian Louboutin can legally 
monopolize the color red on shoe soles by defending the trademarkability of its red 
sole mark.24  Moreover, there has been an increasing number of single color 
symbols registered as trademarks.25 This raises the question of whether single color 
marks will hinder competition and harm consumer interests. Statistics show that a 
number of single color trademarks have been registered in the United States.26 
More surprisingly, familiar colors are protected by registered trademarks. Target 
                                           
21 See Sarah Tremont & Simon Frankel, Louboutin Launches New Wave of U.S. Trademark 
Litigation Over Red-Soled Shoes; Charles Jourdan and Alba are Louboutin’s Latest Targets, 
COVBRANDS (June 10, 2013), http://www.covbrands.com/2013/06/10/louboutin-launches-new-
wave-of-u-s-trademark-litigation-over-red-soled-shoes/; Louboutin Files One of Its First Post-
YSL Lawsuits, FASHION L. (May 28, 2013), www.fashion-law.org/2013/05/louboutin-files-one-
of-its-first-post.html#.UfiwYFNSbV0.   
22 See Camille Pecnard, Supreme Court Invalidates Louboutin's Red-sole Trademark, INT’L 
L. OFF. (Nov. 12, 2012),  http://www.internationallawoffice.com/newsletters/ 
detail.aspx?g=e7f9ee16-36df-44b1-8108-2e6283f61fa7; Lucy Waterlow and Hannah Roberts, 
Louboutin Loses Case to Stop Zara Selling Eed-soled Shoes, MAIL ONLINE (June 11, 2012), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-2157558/Christian-Louboutin-loses-case-stop-high-
street-store-Zara-selling-red-soled-shoes.html. 
23 See Gino Van Roeyen, Dutch Company Van Haren Squashed Underneath the Red Sole of 
Louboutin, MARQUES (April 21, 2013), https://www.marques.org/Class46/Article.asp?D_ 
A=20130421&XID=BHA3193. 
24 See Suk, supra note 9 (pointing out that Christina Louboutin “seemingly wants to 
trademark “red” rather than a particular shade of this color”). 
25 See Ann Bartow, The True Colors of Trademark. Law: Greenlighting a Red Tide of Anti 
Competition Blues, 97 KY. L.J. 263, 263 (2008) (“The elevation of color to stand–alone 
trademark status illustrates the unbounded nature of trademarks within the judicial 
consciousness.”). 
26 See Susan Neuberger Weller, When Can You Claim a Color as Your Trademark?, 
LEXOLOGY (Sept. 13, 2012), www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=c47ea3c8-ca3a-4f4c-
b9e6-acadcac23784 (“Many companies have successfully obtained trademark protection for a 
single color . . . .”); BELINDA J. SCRIMENTI, A LEGAL KALEIDOSCOPE—SINGLE COLOR 
TRADMARKS FROM PRE-OWENS-CORNING PINK INSULATION TO LOUBOUTIN RED-SOLED SHOES 
17 (2012), available at http://www.pattishall.com/pdf/Single Color Marks from Owens Corning 
to Louboutin.PDF (“The USPTO register reflects a growing number of [single] color regirations 
. . . .”). 
148 N.Y.U. JOURNAL OF INTELL. PROP. & ENT. LAW [Vol. 3:142 
owns a trademark for its signature red, Tiffany for its Tiffany blue, UPS for brown, 
and T-Mobile for magenta.27 
On the other hand, the social justice perspective discussed in this article calls 
for a theoretical and policy shift in trademark theory. Trademark law has long been 
shaped by the economic efficiency policy.28 Following this policy, trademark law 
serves the economic need to incentivize enterprises to offer high quality goods and 
to protect the consumer interest in obtaining correct information about the source 
of goods.29 As utilitarian-based economic calculations are notorious for neglect of 
distributive issues, conventional trademark theory has also turned a blind eye to the 
social justice dimension of the law.30 Nevertheless, this issue awaits acute 
diagnosis and treatment. Recent decades have seen trademark law evolve from the 
guarantee of the authenticity of sources of goods and services into a legal 
instrument with an additional status-conferring function.31 The statutory insertion 
of anti-dilution protection exemplifies this shift.32  
                                           
27 Aleksi Tzatzev, 10 Colors That Might Get You Sued, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 29, 2012), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/colors-that-are-trademarked-2012-9?op=1. 
28 See Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621, 624 
(2004) (observing that the economic efficiency-based theory “has been adopted at the highest 
levels of American law. No alternative account of trademark doctrine currently exists.”) (citation 
omitted); MADHAVI SUNDER, FROM GOODS TO A GOOD LIFE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
GLOBAL JUSTICE 23 (2012) (pointing out that “intellectual property is understood almost 
exclusively as being about incentives.”) (emphasis in origin); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. 
Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory or Fait Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 461, 467 
(2005) (“Trademark law . . . aims to promote more competitive markets by improving the quality 
of information in those markets.”); Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of 
Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE. DAME L. REV. 1839, 1844 (2007) (concluding that the conventional 
wisdom about “the goal of trademark law is—and always has been—to improve the quality of 
information in the marketplace and thereby reduce consumer search costs”). 
29 See Beebe, supra note 28, at 623 (“The Chicago School asserts that trademarks serve two 
efficiency-enhancing functions: First, trademarks lessen consumer search costs by making 
products and producers easier to identify in the marketplace, and second, trademarks encourage 
producers to invest in quality by ensuring that they, and not their competitors, reap the 
reputation-related rewards of that investment.” (citation omitted)). 
30 See Haochen Sun, Can Louis Vuitton Dance with HiPhone? Rethinking the Idea of Social 
Justice in Intellectual Property Law, 15 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 389, 428 (2012) (pointing 
out that the utilitarianism-based intellectual property theory has inadequacy in “accommodating 
and promoting social justice”). 
31 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi 
Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 397 (1990) (arguing that trademarks have begun to 
serve an additional purpose, of “becom[ing] products in their own right, valued as indicators of 
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With worsening social inequalities nationally33 and globally,34 this Article 
argues that social justice must be wholeheartedly embraced as a core value for 
trademark protection of famous trademarks (especially those famous luxury 
brands). Without nuanced social justice analysis, trademark theory and practice 
will continue to shield the rich from the world of poverty. Against this backdrop, 
the red sole mark as a luxury brand provides a lens through which we can re-
examine the social justice issues in trademark law. It further shows the urgent need 
to inject social justice considerations into the ongoing debate about how 
intellectual property law should be reformed to encourage fashion design 
innovation.35    
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses the role of the concept of 
trademark distinctiveness in the law and how the Louboutin courts dealt with this 
issue. Part II examines the complexity of weighing the acquired distinctiveness 
status of marks by courts. It further reveals that the Louboutin courts unduly 
simplified the inquiry into whether the Louboutin red sole mark had acquired 
requisite distinctiveness. Based on these discussions, Part III puts forward the 
social justice mandate that should be incorporated into the judicial scrutiny of the 
                                                                                                                                        
the status, preferences, and aspirations of those who use them.”); Barton Beebe, Intellectual 
Property Law and the Sumptuary Code, 123 HARV. L. REV. 809, 884 (2010); Alex Kozinski, 
Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 961 (1993).  
32 See Beebe, supra note 31, at 884 (2010). 
33 See Emmanuel Saez, Striking it Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes in the United States, 
ECONOMOMETRICS LABORATORY SOFTWARE ARCHIVE (Sept. 3, 2013), 
elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/saez-UStopincomes-2012.pdf (“Top 1% incomes grew by 31.4% while 
bottom 99% incomes grew only by 0.4% from 2009 to 2012. Hence, the top 1% captured 95% of 
the income gains in the first three years of the recovery.”). 
34 Jason Hickel, The Truth about Extreme Global Inequality, AL JAZEERA (Apr. 14, 2013), 
www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/04/201349124135226392.html (“Global inequality is 
growing in part because of the neoliberal economic policies imposed on developing countries.”). 
      35 Fashion design protection through intellectual property law has been for years a subject of 
controversy among commentators and policy makers. Some have proposed that fashion design 
can be protected within the current intellectual property system. Others have advocated for sui 
generis statutory protection of fashion design. See generally Hemphill & Suk, supra note 6. 
Several legislative proposals have been considered several times by Congress, although not 
adopted. See, e.g., Design Piracy Prohibition Act, H.R.2033, 110th Cong. § 2(c) (2007); Design 
Piracy Prohibition Act, S.1957, 110th Cong. § 2(c) (2007). Other commentators have suggested 
that intellectual property protection of fashion design is not necessary for the fashion industry. 
See Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual 
Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687, 1775–77 (2006). 
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distinctiveness of a mark. It shows that the Louboutin courts shied away from 
confronting the social injustices that had been caused by the protection of the 
Louboutin red sole trademark. These damaged social justice values, the Article will 
further show, have been long cherished by the American liberal tradition and the 
equality-oriented protections of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.  
I 
THE DISTINCTIVENESS DOCTRINE AND THE LOUBOUTIN LITIGATION 
A. The Roadmap of the Distinctiveness Doctrine 
Trademarks are signs that are capable of indicating the sources of goods or 
services. They inform consumers as to who manufactured or provided a particular 
product or service. Therefore, trademark law only protects source-indicating 
signs.36 The concept of distinctiveness serves as a threshold requirement in 
trademark law, filtering out signs that are not capable of indicating sources.37 
Conventionally, the distinctiveness of a mark is weighed by the Abercrombie 
test, which was set forth in Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc.38 
Following this test, courts frequently classify marks into four categories in order of 
generally decreasing distinctiveness: (1) arbitrary or fanciful; (2) suggestive; (3) 
descriptive; and (4) generic.39  
                                           
36 The Lanham Act protects any “word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination” that is 
used “to identify and distinguish” a producer’s goods from those manufactured or sold by others 
and to “indicate the source of the goods.” Specifically, under the Lanham Act, a person must use 
or intend to use a mark to “identify and distinguish [his or her goods]…from those manufactured 
or sold by others and to indicate the source [of the goods].” 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006). 
37 According to courts:  
[a] trade-mark is a merchandising short-cut which induces a purchaser to select 
what he wants, or what he has been led to believe he wants. … Whatever the 
means employed, the aim is the same to convey through the mark, in the minds of 
potential customers, the desirability of the commodity upon which it appears. 
Once this is attained, the trade-mark owner has something of value. If another 
poaches upon the commercial magnetism of the symbol he has created, the owner 
can obtain legal redress.  
Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S. S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942). 
38 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976). 
39 Id. at 9. The court also noted that “the lines [between these classifications of marks] are not 
always bright.” Id. 
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Marks falling into any of the first two categories are deemed inherently 
distinctive and capable of being registered as trademarks.40 Descriptive marks that 
comprise the third category can be registered as trademarks only if they acquired 
distinctiveness through use.41 Generic marks form the last category of marks.42 
They completely lack distinctiveness and thus cannot be registered as a trademark. 
For example, “apple” is a generic mark for apples, as would be “fruit.”43 Therefore, 
the Abercrombie test identifies inherent and acquired distinctiveness as two kinds 
of source-indicating capability that would make signs initially eligible for 
trademark protection.  
1.   Inherent Distinctiveness 
The strongest marks considered inherently distinctive are those that are 
fanciful or arbitrary. Fanciful marks are invented terms that have no commonplace 
or dictionary meaning at all.44 For example, “Kodak”45 for photographic equipment 
or “Exxon”46 for oil and gas products and services. Arbitrary marks are signs with 
dictionary meanings and in common usage that do not in any respect describe the 
goods or service to which they are attached.47 Like a fanciful mark, an arbitrary 
mark is inherently distinctive, but only “within its product market and entitled to 
little or no protection outside of that area.”48 For example, “Apple” is arbitrary for 
computers, but generic for apples and descriptive for apple-flavored candy, liquor, 
or pies.  
                                           
40 Id. at 11 (“If a term is suggestive, it is entitled to registration without proof of secondary 
meaning. . . . [T]he decision of the Patent Office to register a mark without requiring proof of 
secondary meaning affords a rebuttable presumption that the mark is suggestive or arbitrary or 
fanciful rather than merely descriptive.”). 
41 Id. at 10; see also Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.11 (1982). 
42 Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F.2d at 9 (“A generic term is one that refers, or has come to be 
understood as referring, to the genus of which the particular product is a species.”). 
43 However, whether a term is generic necessarily depends on its use in context. For example, 
“ivory” would be generic as applied to a product made from elephant tusks, but arbitrary when 
applied to soap. Id. at 9 n. 6. 
44 Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F.2d at 11 n.12 (defining “the term ‘fanciful’, as a classifying 
concept, is usually applied to words invented solely for their use as trademarks”). 
45 Kellogg Co. v Toucan Golf, Inc., 337 F.3d 616, 624 (6th Cir. 2003). 
46 Sara Lee Corp. v Kayser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 464 (4th Cir. 1996). 
47 Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F.2d at 11 n.12 (holding that “when it is applied in an 
unfamiliar way, the use is called ‘arbitrary’”). 
48 Kellogg, 337 F.3d at 626. 
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Suggestive marks are also inherently distinctive and considered strong 
marks, but less so than arbitrary or fanciful marks. They have a descriptive aspect 
but differ from descriptive marks in that they merely suggest rather than describe 
the qualities of the goods or services to which they are attached.49  
The predominant test of whether a mark is suggestive or descriptive is the 
so-called “imagination test,” which holds that a mark “is suggestive if it requires 
imagination, thought and perception to reach a conclusion as to the nature of 
goods” and “descriptive if it forthwith conveys an immediate idea of the 
ingredients, qualities or characteristics of the goods.”50 For example, the word 
“Citibank” is suggestive because it suggests “an urban or modern bank.” Likewise, 
“Goliath” suggests “a large size” pencil51 and “Roach Motel” suggests insect 
traps.52  
2. Acquired Distinctiveness  
Descriptive marks specifically describe a quality, function, characteristic, or 
ingredient of a product or a service. For example, they include “After Tan” for 
post-tanning lotion and “5 Minute Glue” for fast-drying glue.53 Descriptive marks 
are not inherently distinctive but may acquire distinctiveness over time and use if 
the public comes to recognize the mark as an indication of a source, thus granting 
the mark acquired distinctiveness or “secondary meaning.”54 For example, the 
                                           
49 Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F.2d at 11 (“A term is suggestive if it requires imagination, 
thought and perception to reach a conclusion as to the nature of goods. A term is descriptive if it 
forthwith conveys an immediate idea of the ingredients, qualities or characteristics of the 
goods.”). 
50 Stix Prods., Inc. v United Merchs. & Mfrs., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 479, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); 
see also Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 792 (5th Cir. 1983) 
(identifying four separate tests for distinguishing descriptive and suggestive marks). 
51 DeGidio v. W. Grp Corp., 355 F.3d 506, 510 (6th Cir. 2004). 
52 Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson Chem. Co., 589 F.2d 103, 106 (2d Cir. 1978). 
53 Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 464 (4th Cir. 1996). 
54 G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 198 F. 369, 373 (6th Cir. 1912). This court described the 
origin of secondary meaning as follows:  
It contemplates that a word or phrase originally, and in that sense primarily, 
incapable of exclusive appropriation with reference to an article on the market, 
because geographically or otherwise descriptive, might nevertheless have been 
used so long and so exclusively by one producer with reference to his article that, 
in that trade and to that branch of the purchasing public, the word or phrase had 
come to mean that the article was his product; in other words, had come to be, to 
them, his trade-mark. So it was said that the word had come to have a secondary 
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word “Best” for milk connotes to buyers an assertion of quality. This descriptive 
connotation is the “primary” meaning of the word “Best.” Over a period of 
extensive advertising and sales, however, the word “Best” may acquire a new and 
different meaning such that milk buyers associate the word “Best” not just with its 
primary meaning of high-quality milk, but also with a developed “secondary” 
meaning indicating a particular milk producer.55 For a descriptive mark to acquire 
a secondary meaning, it is not necessary for the public to be able to identify the 
source by name: “it is sufficient if the public is aware that the product comes from 
a single, though anonymous, source.”56 The most important factor is whether 
consumers are able to associate a mark with a producer of goods.57  
However, even if a mark that has acquired a second meaning may not be 
protectable where the mark is “functional,” that is, where it is essential to the use 
or purpose of the product or affects the cost or quality of the product. Qualitex Co. 
v. Jacobson Products Co., Inc.,58 a landmark Supreme Court case, dealt with the 
functionality doctrine. The mark in question was a green-gold color. Apart from 
using that color to avoid noticeable stains, the green-gold color served no other 
function. There was also no competitive need in the industry for such a green-gold 
color, as other colors were equally usable. Therefore, the Supreme Court held that 
the color met the legal requirements for a trademark as it “acts as a symbol that 
                                                                                                                                        
meaning, although this phrase, ‘secondary meaning,‘ seems not happily chosen, 
because, in the limited field, this new meaning is primary rather than secondary; 
that is to say, it is, in that field, the natural meaning. 
Id. 
55 See 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 
15:6 (4th ed. 2008); Thomas R. Lee et al., An Empirical and Consumer Psychology Analysis of 
Trademark Distinctiveness, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1033, 1052 (2009) (“Source-indicating meaning is 
‘secondary’ in the sense that it is second in time. If a word has descriptive semantic meaning that 
relates to the product in question, its ‘primary’ meaning is the one that pre-dates its trademark 
use in commerce.”). 
56 Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 380 (7th Cir. 1976). 
57 Flynn v. AK Peters, Ltd., 377 F.3d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 2004); see Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. 
Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 8 (2d. Cir. 1976) (the discrict court held that “Although ‘safari’ 
is a generic word, a genuine issue of fact exists as to whether the plaintiff has created a 
secondary meaning in its use of the word ‘identifying the source’ and showing that ‘purchasers 
are moved to buy it because of its source.’”). 
58 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995). 
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distinguishes a firm’s goods and identifies their source, without serving any other 
significant function.”59  
3. The Significance of the Distinctiveness Doctrine 
Under Landes and Posner’s utilitarian model, trademark protection is 
justified because a distinct mark can minimize the “search costs” that consumers 
incur in identifying a product.60 This justification has heavily informed the 
evolution of major trademark doctrines including the concept of trademark 
distinctiveness. For example, if the brand “Sanka” had no name, a consumer 
ordering it in a restaurant would have to ask for “the decaffeinated coffee made by 
General Foods.” This requires the consumer to remember more and say more, and 
also requires the waiter to read and remember more than just a “Sanka.”61 
Landes and Posner’s model also identifies “administrative costs” associated 
with litigating and resolving disputes on questions of protectability. Although 
courts could always inquire into the economic effects of allowing a particular 
producer to have exclusive rights to a particular mark, the administrative costs of 
doing so would outweigh any expected benefits. Therefore, “the law has sorted 
potential marks into a few broad classes according to distinctiveness and has made 
classification determinative of legality.”62  
Under Landes and Posner’s model, fanciful, arbitrary, and suggestive marks 
are inherently distinctive and eligible for trademark protection not because of 
consumers’ perception of their distinctiveness, but because the “elasticity of 
supply” of such terms is high, since there are plenty of words for sellers to choose 
from. Hence, protection of these categories of terms will not impose significant 
costs on competitors.  
                                           
59 Id. at 166. 
60 WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 167-68 (2003); see also New Kids on the Block v. News Am. 
Pub., 971 F.2d 302, 305-06 nn.2-3 (1992) (“In economic terms, trademarks reduce consumer 
search costs by informing people that trademarked products come from the same source. . . . 
Trademark protection, like other legal protections of property rights, guards against the overuse 
of resources while also providing incentives for the creation of new combinations of 
resources.”). 
61 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 
J.L. & ECON. 265, 269 (1987). 
62 Id. at 188. 
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On the other hand, descriptive marks are prima facie ineligible for protection 
because a given product only has so many attributes and protection of a word that 
describes a key attribute will enable the trademark holder to obtain economic rent 
by making it “more costly for his rivals to inform their customers of the attributes 
of their brands without using the same descriptive word.”63 Hence, protection for 
such non-distinctive terms would cause social loss and hamper competition.  
However, Landes and Posner’s model does not distinguish between a 
descriptive mark that has acquired distinctiveness and one that is inherently 
distinctive. As long as the mark is distinctive, the economic model presumes that 
trademark protection could lower consumers’ search costs by indicating the source 
of the goods, and hence create net social benefits.  
 
B. The Distinctiveness of the Louboutin Red Sole Mark 
As noted in Section A,64 the Supreme Court’s Qualitex decision paved the 
way for increased registrations of single color trademarks. The recent litigation 
between Christian Louboutin and YSL raised a question as to whether the red sole 
could be eligible for trademark protection.  
Christian Louboutin, a French luxury company, has used red lacquered 
outsoles for its high fashion women’s shoes since 1992.65 It applied to register the 
red sole mark and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office approved the application 
in 2008. In 2011, YSL sold four monochromatic shoe models bearing red outsoles 
similar to those of Louboutin. After failed negotiations, Christian Louboutin filed a 
lawsuit against YSL in the Southern District of New York for trademark 
infringement and sought a preliminary injunction to prevent YSL from marketing 
the shoes concerned. In response, YSL counter-claimed for cancellation of 
Christian Louboutin’s trademark on the grounds that it is not distinctive. The 
District Court ruled in favour of YSL, holding that the red sole mark was a 
                                           
63 Id. at 189. 
64 See supra Part I.A.1. 
65 See Christian Louboutin S.A. v Yves Saint Laurent Am., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 445, 447 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (Louboutin I) (“Sometime around 1992 designer Christian Louboutin had a 
bright idea. He began coloring glossy vivid red the outsoles of his high fashion women’s 
shoes.”); Lauren Collins, Sole Mate: Christian Louboutin and the Psychology of Shoes, NEW 
YORKER (Mar. 28, 2011), http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/03/28/110328fa_fact_ 
collins?currentPage=1 (“The sole of each of his shoes is lacquered in a vivid, glossy red.”). 
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functional aspect of fashion design and thereby not eligible for trademark 
protection.66 Christian Louboutin appealed to the Second Circuit, which later 
overturned the District Court’s decision on the functionality of the red sole mark. 67 
1. Decision of the District Court 
The District Court focused on whether the red sole mark merited trademark 
protection, a threshold issue in trademark litigation.68 After considering the special 
role of the red color in fashion design, the District Court concluded that the 
registration of the red sole mark should be invalidated.  
Although Louboutin’s certificate of registration gave rise to the statutory 
presumption that the trademark was valid and merited protection, the District Court 
determined that the presumption of validity may be rebutted.69 In rebutting the 
presumption, the District Court turned to the Supreme Court’s Qualitex decision, 
which held that color might be protectable as a trademark “where that color has 
attained ‘secondary meaning’ and therefore identifies and distinguishes a particular 
brand.”70 However, it may not be protectable where it is “functional,” meaning that 
color is essential to the use or purpose of the product, or affects the cost or quality 
of the product.71 In other words, color can meet the legal requirements for a 
trademark only if “it can act as a symbol that distinguishes a firm’s goods and 
identifies their source, without serving any other significant function.”72 Following 
the Qualitex decision, the District Court pointed out that trademark protection has 
been extended to a single color in other industries. However, in the fashion 
industry, only distinct patterns or combinations of shades and colors that create a 
distinct recognizable mark were eligible for trademark protection.73  
Applying the law to the facts, the District Court reasoned that given the 
unique characteristics and needs of the fashion industry, color serves not simply to 
identify or advertise a commercial source, but possesses ornamental beauty and 
                                           
66 Louboutin I, 778 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
67 Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holdings, Inc., 696 F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 
2012) (Louboutin II). 
68 Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 114 (2d Cir. 2009); Louis 
Vuitton Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 454 F.3d 108, 115 (2d Cir. 2006). 
69 Lane Capital Mgmt., Inc. v. Lane Capital Mgmt., Inc., 192 F.3d 337, 345 (2d Cir. 1999). 
70 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163 (1995). 
71 Id. at 165. 
72 Id. at 166. 
73 Louis Vuitton Malletier, 454 F.3d at 116. 
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performs a creative function, aiming to please, beautify, and be useful. The District 
Court quoted Christian Louboutin himself, who acknowledged significant, non-
trademark functions for choosing red for his outsoles, such as showing “sex 
appeal”74 and “energy.”75 Furthermore, adding a red lacquered finish to the shoe 
also made the cost of production higher than the cost for those without the same 
ornamental finish.76 Therefore, Christian Louboutin’s trademark registration for 
use of a single lacquered red color on outsoles was “functional,” and had affected 
the cost and quality of the shoes and also significantly undermined competitors’ 
ability to compete in the fashion industry.77 On these grounds, the District Court 
ruled that a single color can never serve as a trademark in the fashion industry,78 
rendering the red sole mark ineligible for trademark protection. 
2. Decision of the Second Circuit 
The Second Circuit, however, overturned the District Court’s decision on the 
functionality of the red sole mark. It argued that the District Court’s decision 
categorically excluding a single color from trademark protection for fashion design 
was based on an incorrect understanding of the doctrine of aesthetic 
functionality.79 The Second Circuit pointed out that the doctrine denies trademark 
protection only where “an ornamental feature is claimed as a trademark and 
trademark protection would significantly hinder competition by limiting the range 
of adequate alternative designs.”80 However, “distinctive and arbitrary 
arrangements of predominantly ornamental features”81 that do not “significantly 
                                           
74 Louboutin I, 778 F. Supp. 2d 445, 453-54 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
75 Id. at 453. 
76 Id. at 454. 
77 Id. (“Because the use of red outsoles serves nontrademark functions other than as a source 
identifier, and affects the cost and quality of the shoe, the Court must examine whether granting 
trademark rights for Louboutin's use of the color red as a brand would ‘significantly hinder 
competition,’ that is, ‘permit one competitor (or a group) to interfere with legitimate 
(nontrademark-related) competition through actual or potential exclusive use of an important 
product ingredient.’”(quoting Qualitex Co. v Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 170 (1995))). 
78 Id. at 457. 
79 Louboutin II, 696 F.3d 206, 218-24 (2d Cir. 2012). 
80 Id. at 222 (quoting Forschner Grp., Inc. v. Arrow Trading Co., 124 F.3d 402, 409–10 (2d 
Cir.1997)). 
81 Id. at 222 (quoting Fabrication Enterprises., Inc., v. Hygenic Corp., 64 F.3d 53, 59 (2d Cir. 
1995)). 
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undermine competitors’ ability to compete in the relevant market”82 are non-
functional and thus eligible for trademark protection.  
     After rejecting the District Court’s blanket exclusion of single color fashion 
marks from trademark protection, the Second Circuit proceeded to determine 
whether the red sole mark was distinctive enough to merit trademark protection. 
The Supreme Court has held that color marks “can never be inherently 
distinctive.”83 They can only be protected as trademarks if they have acquired 
secondary meaning.84 The Second Circuit followed the Supreme Court’s decisions 
by directly examining whether the red sole mark has gained sufficient secondary 
meaning in the minds of the public.85 The Second Circuit pointed to evidence 
submitted by Louboutin that included substantial advertising expenditures, 
widespread media coverage, and prominent sales success.86 The combination of 
these evidential facts demonstrated that Louboutin’s color mark had requisite 
secondary meaning so as to merit trademark protection when used as a red outsole 
contrasting with the remainder of the shoe.87  
The Second Circuit, however, found that without the contrast with the 
remainder of the shoe, the Louboutin’s red sole mark had not acquired requisite 
secondary meaning.88 In particular, the court ruled that it had not done so “in an 
application of a red sole to a red shoe.”89 Therefore, it held that YSL’s use of the 
                                           
82 Id. at 222 (quoting Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1006 (2d Cir.1995)). 
83 Qualitex Co. v Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162-63 (1995); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 
Samara Bros., Inc. 529 U.S. 205, 206 (2000). 
84 Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 163. 
85 Louboutin II, 696 F.3d at 225 (“Although a single color, standing alone, can almost never 
be inherently distinctive because it does not ‘almost automatically tell a customer that [it] refer[s] 
to a brand,’ a color as used here is certainly capable of acquiring secondary meaning.” (citation 
omitted) (quoting Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 162–63 (emphasis omitted); and Mana Prods., Inc. v. 
Columbia Cosmetics Mfg., Inc., 65 F.3d 1063, 1070 (2d Cir.1995))). 
86 Id.  at 226-27. 
87 Genesee Brewing Co., v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124 F. 3d 137, 143 n.4 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(quoting Centaur Commc’ns, Ltd. v A/S/M Commc’ns, Inc., 830 F.2d 1217, 1222 (2d Cir. 
1985)). 
88 Id. at 227 (“We further hold that the record fails to demonstrate that the secondary 
meaning of the Red Sole Mark extends to uses in which the sole does not contrast with the 
upper—in other words, when a red sole is used on a monochromatic red shoe.”). 
89 Id.  at 228. 
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red sole on its monochrome shoes did not constitute use of the Louboutin red sole 
mark. Nor had it caused likelihood of confusion.90  
 The court further held that the evidence presented by Louboutin failed to 
demonstrate that the secondary meaning of the red sole mark extended to uses in 
which the sole did not contrast with the remainder of the shoe. In particular, 
Louboutin’s own consumer surveys show that when consumers were shown YSL’s 
monochrome red shoe, nearly everyone misidentified the red sole of the shoe as 
Louboutin’s, rather than its red color generally.91 Therefore, the Court held that 
Louboutin’s trademark protection was limited to the use of contrasting red 
lacquered outsoles only. And since Louboutin sought to enjoin YSL from using a 
red sole as part of a monochrome red shoe, the District Court’s order to deny 
preliminary injunction to Louboutin was affirmed in part.  
II 
RE-EXAMINING THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF THE RED SOLE MARK 
As discussed in Part I, the Second Circuit upheld the validity of the red sole 
mark, although it restricted protection to the red sole when contrasted with the 
upper parts of the shoe. However, both courts did not dispute that the red sole mark 
was distinctive enough to merit trademark protection, for it had acquired secondary 
meaning through use.  
But is it true that the red sole mark is distinctive enough to merit trademark 
protection? This Part will argue against the courts’ decisions on the distinctiveness 
of the red sole mark. It will first reveal that a showing of secondary meaning is a 
rigorous judicial inquiry combining facts and law. This Part will then demonstrate 
that neither the District Court nor the Second Circuit conducted rigorous inquiries 
into whether the red sole mark has acquired requisite secondary meaning. 
Therefore, a rigorous application of the distinctiveness requirement is a vital step 
to shape trademark law in a manner conducive to the promotion of social justice by 
filtering away any marks (single color marks included) not desirable for trademark 
protection.  
                                           
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
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A. The Tough Roadmap of the Secondary Meaning Doctrine 
    As noted in Part I,92 the doctrine of secondary meaning allows a user of a 
non-inherently distinctive symbol to receive trademark protection if his attempts 
are effective enough to achieve consumer recognition of the symbol as source-
identifying.93 Therefore, plaintiffs (senior mark users) must furnish evidence 
showing the acquisition of secondary meaning. 94  
  Although courts have applied slightly different standards of review,95 they 
have taken the following two steps to examine the existence of secondary 
meaning.96 First, courts consider the scope of the purchasing public that may 
associate a mark with the producer. Second, courts determine the effectiveness of a 
plaintiff’s promotional efforts in creating secondary meaning among the 
purchasing public. 
                                           
92 See supra Part I.A.1. 
93 See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 8 (2d Cir. 1976) 
(“Although ‘safari’ is a generic word, a genuine issue of fact exists as to whether the plaintiff has 
created a secondary meaning in its use of the word ‘identifying the source’ and showing that 
“purchasers are moved to buy it because of its source.” (quoting Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. 
Hunting World, Inc., 327 F. Supp. 657, 662 (S.D.N.Y. 1971))); MCCARTHY, supra note 55, § 
15:30 (“In one sense, the seller is attempting to get the buyer class to associate a new, secondary 
meaning with a common designation or shape—whether it is descriptive, geographically 
descriptive, a personal name, or any of the other types of symbols that require consumer 
recognition for protection. The trier of fact, like a lexicographer of modern slang, must attempt to 
find out what meaning the public now attaches to a designation that already has a primary 
meaning in the language.”). 
94 See, e.g., In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. 774 F.2d 1116, 1125 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“An 
evidentiary showing of secondary meaning, adequate to show that a mark has acquired 
distinctiveness indicating the origin of the goods, includes evidence of the trademark owner's 
method of using the mark, supplemented by evidence of the effectiveness of such use to cause 
the purchasing public to identify the mark with the source of the product.”); MCCARTHY, supra 
note 55, § 15:30. 
95 See MARY LAFRANCE, UNDERSTANDING TRADEMARK LAW 57 (2d ed. 2009). 
96 MCCARTHY, supra note 55, § 15:30.(“The legal problems surrounding the issue of 
secondary meaning are mainly those of evidence. That is, how does one prove, in the adversary, 
litigious context, the state of mind of buyers? How does one prove, as a fact, that a substantial 
number of prospective buyers do associate the mark with only one seller of those goods?”). 
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1. The Scope of the Consuming Public 
i.  Who is “the purchasing public”? 
In applying the doctrine of secondary meaning, courts often have to 
ascertain whether the purchasing public has associated the mark in question with a 
particular source through an acquired secondary meaning. Courts have decided that 
the successful acquisition of secondary meaning hinges on whether “in the minds 
of the public, the primary significance of a product feature . . . is to identify the 
source of the product . . . .”97 It is therefore important to identify the relevant 
purchasing public. In most cases, the purchasing public consists of consumers. 
However, if the relevant buying class consists of both dealers and ultimate 
consumers, then the state of mind of the dealers would also be important.98  
Case law has adopted the notion that it is the mental association of the mark 
in the minds of current as well as prospective buyers that matters. This precludes 
asking merely what a casual and disinterested potential consumer thought.99 For 
example, in Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc. the court asserted that “[t]he basic 
element of secondary meaning is, thus, the mental association by a substantial 
segment of consumers and potential consumers between the alleged mark and a 
single source of the product.”100 
Specifically, courts have ruled that the purchasing public refers to a specific 
segment of the general public. For example, in Centaur Communications, Ltd. v. 
                                           
97 Inwood LaboratoriesLabs., Inc. v. Ives LaboratoriesLabs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.11 
(1982) (citing Kellogg Co. v. National Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118 (1938)). The courts 
look to the mental associations of consumers to determine whether secondary meaning has been 
established, often referencing the language in Inwood and Kellogg. See, e.g., Borinquen Biscuit 
Corp. v. M.V. Trading Corp., 443 F.3d 112, 116 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting Inwood Labs., 456 U.S. 
at 851 n.11); Abraham Zion v. Lebow, 761 F.2d  93, 104 (2d Cir. 1985) (requiring an association 
“in the mind of the public”); Walt-West Enters. v. Gannett Co., 695 F.2d 1050, 1057 (7th Cir. 
1982) (quoting Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 118); U.S. Search, LLC v. U.S. Search.com Inc., 300 F.3d 
517, 523 (4th Cir. 2002) (protection of descriptive mark requires secondary meaning “in the 
minds of the public”). 
98 Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 138 F.3d 277, 295 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[W]hen . . . 
the relevant market includes both distributors and ultimate purchasers, the state of mind of 
dealers is important in determining if secondary meaning exists . . . .”). 
99 See Am. Luggage Works, Inc. v. U.S. Trunk Co., 158 F. Supp. 50, 52 (D. Mass. 1957) 
(considering whether the relevant buyer class, and not necessarily the whole public, associated 
the term with the plaintiff’s products). 
100 778 F.2d 1352, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985). 
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A/S/M Communications, Inc.,101 the relevant segment of the purchasing public for 
determining whether secondary meaning exists for the title of a marketing trade 
magazine was defined as “executives in the international marketing and advertising 
community in the United States.” The court further declared that, “[i]t is only 
necessary to show that a substantial segment of the relevant group of consumers 
made the requisite association between the product and the producer.”102 
ii.  A substantial number of the relevant purchasing public  
The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition indicates that it is not 
necessary for a majority of the relevant purchasing public to associate the mark 
with a single source.103 It is only necessary that a “substantial part” of the 
purchasing public or a “significant number” of prospective purchasers identify the 
term as a trademark. 104  Case law has followed this guidance.105 For instance, the 
court in Folmer Graflex Corp. v. Graphic Photo Serv. specified that “[w]hat is 
required is that a substantial section of the purchasing public should be proved to 
identify the trade name of the plaintiff's goods, and that this should be true of the 
district in which the defendant's trade is done.”106 Moreover, another court in North 
Carolina Dairy Foundation, Inc. v. Foremost-Mackesson, Inc. confirmed that 
                                           
101 830 F.2d 1217, 1222 (2d Cir. 1987). 
102 Courts have stated that the relevant segment includes “architects, designers, decorators 
and upscale sophisticated customers” for proving secondary meaning in the design of a particular 
desk lamp. See Lon Tai Shing Co. v. Koch + Lowy, No. 90 Civ. 4464(DNE), 1991 WL 170734, 
*9 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 20, 1991). “[I]ndividuals broadly associated with other institutions of higher 
education in a given geographic area” sufficed as a relevant group among which the secondary 
meaning of a college’s name had been established. See President & Trs. of Colby College v. 
Colby Coll.-N.H., 508 F.2d 804, 808 (1st Cir. 1975). 
103 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13, cmt. e (1995). 
104 See id. 
105 In cases where the defendant's activities are confined to a limited geographical area, the 
plaintiff only needs to prove that secondary meaning exists among buyers within that area such 
that confusion is likely. See Shoppers Fair of Ark., Inc. v. Sanders Co., 328 F.2d 496, 501 (8th 
Cir. 1964); see also Oakford Co. v. Kroger Co., 157 F. Supp. 453, 458 (S.D. Ill. 1957) (holding 
that both parties acquired secondary meaning for their respective trade names in different parts of 
the same state). However, in a case where the remedy was a nationwide importation exclusion 
order, the International Trade Commission required proof of secondary meaning throughout the 
United States. See In re Sneakers with Fabric Uppers & Rubber Soles, Inv. No. 337-TA-118, 
USITC Pub. 1366 (Mar. 9, 1983) (Final).  
106 44 F. Supp. 429 (D. Mass. 1942) (quoting HARRY D. NIMS, LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION 
AND TRADE-MARKS 296 (3d ed. 1929)).   
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“[p]roof of secondary meaning is sufficient if it is shown that a substantial segment 
of the buying population associates the mark with a single source.”107  
Courts have defined in different ways what a “substantial number” of the 
purchasing public means. Some courts have emphasized that secondary meaning 
requires proof that more than a “relatively small number of people” associate the 
designation with the applicant for registration.108 Other courts have required “more 
than proof of the existence of one person or even a relatively small number of 
people who associate the term with a single source.”109 In Norm Thompson 
Outfitters, Inc. v. General Motors Corp.,110 the court pointed to the “sparseness of 
people” who associate the mark with plaintiff in holding that acquisition of 
secondary meaning had not adequately been shown. 
Where a survey has been conducted to ascertain the percentage of people for 
whom the mark has acquired secondary meaning, courts have been vague in 
defining what the minimum acceptable percentage is. However, it is clear that a 
percentage below 10 percent is generally insufficient. In Roselux Chemical Co. v. 
Parsons Ammonia Co., a survey showing that ten percent of users associated the 
name with a single source was deemed insufficient.111  Likewise, in Citizens 
Banking Corp. v. Citizens Financial Group, Inc., an eight percent identification 
with the plaintiff’s mark was found “insufficient to demonstrate secondary 
meaning.”112 
2.  Evidentiary Requirements for Proving Secondary Meaning 
After determining the scope of the purchasing public, courts need to examine 
whether the promotional efforts made by the senior mark user were effective in 
establishing secondary meaning to identify the source of his products or services. 
Proof of secondary meaning entails meeting rigorous evidentiary requirements.113 
To determine whether a term has acquired secondary meaning, courts usually 
require the senior mark user to submit direct evidence in the form of direct 
                                           
107 154 Cal. Rptr. 794, 801 (Ct. App. 1979). 
108 See Roselux Chem. Co. v. Parsons Ammonia Co., 299 F.2d 855 (C.C.P.A. 1962).  
109 See Wembley, Inc. v. Diplomat Tie Co., 216 F. Supp. 565, 583 (D. Md. 1963). 
110 448 F.2d 1293, 1297 (9th Cir. 1971). 
111 299 F.2d 855, 862 (C.C.P.A. 1962). 
112 No. 07-11514, 2008 WL 1995104 (E.D. Mich. May 6, 2008), aff'd, 320 F. App’x 341 (6th 
Cir. 2009). 
113 See Boston Beer v. Slesar Bros. Brewing Co., 9 F.3d 175, 181 (1st Cir. 1993); Yankee 
Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 99 F. Supp. 2d 140, 156-57 (D. Mass. 2000). 
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consumer testimonies and/or consumer surveys. Courts also consider 
circumstantial evidence such as: (1) exclusivity, length, and manner of use; (2) 
amount and manner of advertising; (3) amount of sales and number of customers; 
(4) established place in the market; and/or (5) proof of intentional copying.114 
Direct evidence in the form of consumer testimonies and professionally 
conducted surveys is important because it directly reflects buyers’ state of mind. 
The Eighth Circuit stated that “[c]onsumer surveys are recognized by several 
circuits as the most direct and persuasive evidence of secondary meaning.”115 The 
Ninth Circuit also deemed consumer surveys “the most persuasive evidence of 
secondary meaning.”116 
If a case is unclear, a survey is usually necessary to prove secondary 
meaning. However, survey evidence is “not a requirement for such proof,”117 and 
the “absence of consumer surveys need not preclude a finding of acquired 
distinctiveness.”118 In fact, secondary meaning is more often proved by 
circumstantial evidence, which is “sufficient to meet a party's burden of proof to 
establish a claim.”119  
Circumstantial evidence of the seller's efforts in advertising the mark 
routinely consists of evidence of the size of the seller, the number of sales made, 
large amounts spent in promotion and advertising, the scope of publicity given to 
the mark, and any similar evidence showing wide exposure of the buyer class to 
the mark in question.120 However, in determining whether a mark has acquired 
secondary meaning, the crucial issue is not the promotional efforts made by a 
                                           
114 Echo Travel, Inc. v. Travel Assocs., Inc., 870 F.2d 1264, 1267 (7th Cir. 1989); see also 
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 973 F.2d 1033, 1041 (2d Cir. 1992) (“Among 
the factors that we have found relevant to this inquiry in the past are advertising expenditures, 
consumer studies, sales success, unsolicited media coverage, attempts to plagiarize and length 
and exclusivity of use . . . . There are undoubtedly other types of evidence that would also be 
relevant to a claim of secondary meaning.”). 
115 Co-Rect Prods., Inc. v. Marvy! Adver. Photography, Inc., 780 F.2d 1324, 1333 n.9 (8th 
Cir. 1985).  
116 Vision Sports, Inc. v. Melville Corp., 888 F.2d 609, 615 (9th Cir. 1989). 
117 Comm. for Idaho's High Desert v. Yost, 92 F.3d 814, 822 (9th Cir. 1996). 
118 Yamaha Int’l Corp. v. Hoshino Gakki Co., 840 F.2d 1572, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
119 Heartland Bank v. Heartland Home Fin., Inc., 335 F.3d 810, 820 (8th Cir. 2003). 
120 See American Scientific Chem., Inc. v. Am. Hosp. Supply Corp., 690 F.2d 791, 793 (9th 
Cir. 1982).  
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senior mark user, but the effectiveness of those efforts.121 As the Federal Circuit 
put it, “[t]he test of secondary meaning is the effectiveness of the efforts to create 
it.”122 For example, in Tonawanda Street Corp. v. Fay's Drug Co., Inc., the court 
held that long and exclusive use without evidence of consumer recognition was 
insufficient in proving secondary meaning.123 And in Genovese Drug Stores, Inc. v. 
TGC Stores, Inc., the court held that “[t]he expenditure of large sums of money 
alone does not establish secondary meaning ‘unless the [trademark proprietor] 
explains how its efforts were effective in causing the relevant group of consumers 
to associate the mark with [a single source].’”124  
As to the minimum sufficiency of evidence required to prove secondary 
meaning, the general rule is that the more descriptive the term, the greater the 
evidentiary burden to establish secondary meaning. In other words, the less 
distinctive the term, the greater the quantity and quality of evidence of secondary 
meaning needed to prove the requisite degree of distinctiveness.125  
For example, in Supreme Wine Co. v. American Distilling Co., the court 
found that, “the word ‘supreme’ is so totally lacking in distinctiveness, originality 
and uniqueness that, in the absence of compelling proof that it has acquired a 
secondary meaning to the buying public, it is not entitled to trademark 
protection.”126 Moreover, in Commerce Nat. Ins. Services, Inc. v. Commerce Ins. 
Agency, Inc., the court held that for a highly descriptive term, “the evidentiary bar 
must be placed somewhat higher.”127 For example, if survey evidence was used for 
                                           
121 See, e.g., Chas. D. Briddell, Inc. v. Alglobe Trading Corp., 194 F.2d 416, 418–19 (2d Cir. 
1952) (An advertising expenditure “measures plaintiff’s efforts to establish a secondary meaning, 
but does not determine its success . . . . Large expenditures for advertising do not compel a 
conclusion that the task has been accomplished” (quoting Gen. Time Instruments Corp. v. U.S. 
Time Corp., 165 F.2d 853, 854–55 (2d Cir. 1948))). 
122 Braun Inc. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 975 F.2d 815, 827 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (quoting First 
Brands Corp. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 809 F.2d 1378, 1383 (9th Cir. 1987)). 
123 842 F.2d 643, 648 (2d Cir. 1988). 
124 939 F. Supp. 340, 347 (D. N.J. 1996) (quoting FM 103.1, Inc. v. Universal Broad. of 
N.Y., Inc., 929 F. Supp. 187, 196 (D. N.J. 1996)). 
125 See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Interco Tire Corp., No. 96,404, 1998 WL 998958, at 
*16 (T.T.A.B. Sept. 11, 1998) (stating “that the greater the degree of descriptiveness which a 
design possesses, the heavier is a party's burden of proving that such a design has in fact become 
distinctive of the goods with which it is associated”). 
126 Supreme Wine Co. v. Am. Distilling Co., 310 F.2d 888, 889 (2d Cir. 1962).  
127 Commerce Nat’l. Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Commerce Ins. Agency, Inc., 214 F.3d 432, 440–41 
(3d Cir. 2000). 
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a highly descriptive mark, then the evidentiary proof of secondary meaning would 
correspondingly require a higher percentage of survey respondents who could 
recognize or associate the mark with the seller. 
This approach is also taken by the Federal Circuit, which ruled that the 
burden to prove secondary meaning “becomes more difficult as the mark’s 
descriptiveness increases.”128  The Restatement also observes that “[h]ighly 
descriptive terms . . . are less likely to be perceived as trademarks and more likely 
to be useful to competing sellers than are less descriptive terms. More substantial 
evidence of secondary meaning thus will ordinarily be required to establish their 
distinctiveness.”129 
B. Questioning the Distinctiveness of the Red Sole 
As shown in the preceding section, the application of the secondary meaning 
doctrine is a fact-laden process that requires courts to scrutinize whether secondary 
meaning has been established by senior mark users’ marketing and promotional 
efforts.130 This section will demonstrate that the Louboutin courts have failed to 
take seriously the two key issues in the secondary meaning inquiry as discussed in 
the preceding section. The courts’ upholding of the distinctiveness of the red sole 
mark is thus dubious, a point that has not yet been raised by many commentators.  
1. The Consuming Public 
As the preceding section showed, a mark owner must acquire requisite 
secondary meaning for his mark among a substantial number of the relevant 
segment of the consuming public. Because the red sole is a mark applied to shoes, 
the relevant segment of the consuming public should be shoe consumers. One may 
argue that only the existing luxury shoe consumers—a much smaller group of 
people—should be counted as the relevant segment because Christian Louboutin 
markets luxury footwear with exclusive pricing, but the preceding section showed 
that the inquiry into secondary meaning should also include prospective 
consumers. That is, those who are likely to purchase goods after they can mentally 
associate the goods with the relevant marks. The prospective consumer 
requirement should not be limited to consumers of luxury shoes as that would 
preclude potential consumers who may buy such luxury shoes in the short- or 
                                           
128 Yamaha Int’l Corp. v. Hoshino Gakki Co., 840 F.2d 1572, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
129 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13 cmt. e (1995). 
130 See, e.g., MCCARTHY, supra note 55, at § 15:29 (“Whether or not a designation has 
acquired secondary meaning is a question of fact, not an issue of law.”). 
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medium-term future. Another concern is that the distinctiveness of a mark is a 
factor used by courts to determine the outcomes of likelihood-of-confusion 
infringement suits.131 In this process, courts consider whether prospective 
consumers will likely be confused about sources of goods or services. For 
example, in American Luggage Works, Inc. v. United States Trunk Co., the 
plaintiffs failed to prove that retail dealers would likely be confused by the 
defendant’s hand luggage bag designs, because they tended to make a purchase 
“only after [a] detailed talk with a manufacturer’s salesman or upon careful 
inspection of a manufacturer’s catalog or both.”132 The court held that, “the issue is 
not whether the goods would be confused by a casual observer, (trained or 
untrained, professional or lay,) but the issue is whether the goods would be 
confused by a prospective purchaser at the time he considered making the 
purchase.”133 
Although the District Court in the Louboutin litigation invalidated the red 
sole mark, it indirectly acknowledged that the mark had acquired secondary 
meaning as follows: 
Film stars and other A-list notables equally pay homage, at prices that 
for some styles command as much as $1,000 a pair. And even at that 
expense, a respectable niche of consumers wears the brand, to the tune 
of about 240,000 pairs a year sold in the United States, with revenues 
of approximately $135 million projected for 2011. When Hollywood 
starlets cross red carpets and high fashion models strut down runways, 
and heads turn and eyes drop to the celebrities’ feet, lacquered red 
outsoles on high-heeled, black shoes flaunt a glamorous statement that 
pops out at once. For those in the know, cognitive bulbs instantly flash 
                                           
131 The Trademark Dilution Revision Act also identifies a non-exhaustive list of six factors 
that courts “may consider” when determining whether a mark is likely to cause dilution by 
blurring. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (2006). These six factors are: (1) “[t]he degree of similarity 
between the mark or trade name and the famous mark”; (2) “[t]he degree of inherent or acquired 
distinctiveness of the famous mark”; (3) “[t]he extent to which the owner of the famous mark is 
engaging in substantially exclusive use of the mark”; (4) “[t]he degree of recognition of the 
famous mark”; (5) “[w]hether the user of the mark or trade name intended to create an 
association with the famous mark”; and (6) “[a]ny actual association between the mark or trade 
name and the famous mark.” Id. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(i)-(vi). 
132 American Luggage Works, Inc. v. United States Trunk Co., 158 F. Supp. 50, 54 (D. Mass. 
1957). 
133 Id. at 53. 
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to associate: “Louboutin.” This recognition is acknowledged, for 
instance, at least by a clientele of the well-heeled, in the words of a 
lyrical stylist of modern times [in Jennifer Lopez’s “Louboutins” 
song].134 
With this presentation of facts, the District Court quickly concluded that the 
red sole mark had morphed into a brand with “worldwide recognition at the high 
end of women's wear.”135 The Second Circuit agreed with the District Court’s line 
of reasoning in this regard.136 
The passage quoted above, however, merely shows that only a small number 
of famous people like film stars and A-list notables were counted as the consuming 
public for the secondary meaning inquiry. The mention of the “Louboutins” song, 
again, indicates only that high-profile people like Jennifer Lopez are regular 
consumers of red-soled Louboutin shoes. Although the District Court referred to 
the fact that around 240,000 pairs of shoes were sold in America in a particular 
year, it did not direct Louboutin to prove who bought their shoes. Are the buyers 
only those celebrities who are rich enough to buy many pairs for red-carpet events? 
Or are they wealthy women living in gated suburbs? Or could they be college 
students who dream of finding jobs in Wall Street and wear red-soled Louboutin 
shoes to impress their future employers? Neither the District Court nor the Second 
Circuit delved into this issue by specifying the relevant segment of the consuming 
public for the secondary meaning inquiry.  
2. Fulfilling the Evidentiary Burden 
As the preceding section showed, plaintiffs (senior mark users) should bear 
the burden of proving that their promotional efforts were effective in creating 
secondary meaning of a mark in the mind of the consuming public. Therefore, 
plaintiffs should furnish direct evidence such as consumer testimonies and 
consumer surveys and/or circumstantial evidence that includes exclusivity, length 
and manner of use, amount and manner of advertising, and the amount of sales and 
number of customers. 
                                           
134 Louboutin I, 778 F. Supp. 2d 445, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
135 Id.  
136 Louboutin II, 696 F.3d 206, 226–27 (2d Cir. 2012). 
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The District Court pointed out that the presumption of the validity of a 
registered trademark is rebuttable137 and a showing of secondary meaning is 
required in weighing whether a single color mark can qualify for trademark 
protection.138 Nevertheless, nothing else in the District Court’s decision addressed 
whether the evidence presented by Christian Louboutin showed their promotional 
efforts had been effective in creating secondary meaning. Instead, the District 
Court invalidated the red sole mark by relying on the functionality doctrine.139 
While the Circuit Court overturned the District Court’s ruling with regard to 
the functionality doctrine, it deferred to the District Court’s ambiguous ruling on 
the acquisition of requisite secondary meaning by Christian Louboutin. In doing 
so, the Circuit Court quickly concluded as follows:  
The record before the District Court included extensive evidence of 
Louboutin’s advertising expenditures, media coverage, and sales 
success, demonstrating both that Louboutin has created a “symbol” 
within the meaning of Qualitex, . . . and that the symbol has gained 
secondary meaning that causes it to be “uniquely” associated with the 
Louboutin brand . . . . There is no dispute that Louboutin originated 
this particular commercial use of the lacquered red color over twenty 
years ago. As the District Court determined, in findings of fact that are 
supported by the record and not clearly erroneous, “Louboutin 
invested substantial amounts of capital building a reputation and good 
will, as well as promoting and protecting Louboutin’s claim to 
exclusive ownership of the mark as its signature in women's high 
fashion footwear.” . . . And there is no dispute that Louboutin’s efforts 
were successful “to the point where, in the high-stakes commercial 
markets and social circles in which these things matter a great deal, the 
red outsole became closely associated with Louboutin,” . . .  and 
where unsolicited media attention to that red sole became rampant.140 
                                           
137 Louboutin I, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 450 (“Louboutin's certificate of registration of the Red 
Sole Mark gives rise to a statutory presumption that the mark is valid . . . . However, that 
presumption of validity may be rebutted.” (citations omitted)). 
138  Id. (“In short, color can meet the legal requirements for a trademark if it ‘act[s] as a 
symbol that distinguishes a firm's goods and identifies their source, without serving any other 
significant function.’” (quoting Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 166 (1995))). 
139 See supra Part I.B.1. 
140 Louboutin II, 696 F.3d at 226–27 (citations omitted). 
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This passage showed that the Second Circuit heavily relied on the District 
Court’s finding that the red sole mark had acquired secondary meaning. However, 
this inference is arguably inappropriate. Elsewhere in its decision, the Circuit Court 
quickly confirmed that “[w]here, as here, the record contains sufficient undisputed 
facts to resolve the question of distinctiveness—not to speak of facts found by the 
District Court that are based upon evidence of record and not clearly erroneous—
we may do so as a matter of law.”141  
However, the District Court, as I showed earlier, did not delve deeply into 
the secondary meaning inquiry. It simply repeated some of the promotional facts 
submitted by Louboutin, but did not conduct an evidential inquiry to weigh 
whether promotional efforts were actually effective in creating secondary 
meaning.142 Because of the District Court’s focus on the functionality doctrine, the 
overall decision ignored the necessity of applying the secondary meaning doctrine 
rigorously, leading to an incomplete application of it in the Louboutin decision. It 
did not ascertain the relevant segment of the consuming public that would 
designate the red sole mark as the symbol for identifying source. Nor did it discuss 
whether Louboutin had presented sufficient evidence to show the effectiveness of 
its promotional efforts in establishing the secondary meaning of the red sole mark. 
Moreover, it was also inappropriate for the Second Circuit to cite the Warner 
Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc.143 decision to support its treatment of the acquired 
secondary meaning of the red sole mark as a matter of law rather than a factual 
inquiry.144 This is because the Warner Bros. court did not appropriately apply the 
secondary meaning doctrine. It did not consider the relevant segment of the 
consuming public, nor did it require the plaintiff to show evidence proving the 
effectiveness of its promotional efforts.145  
                                           
141 Id. at 226. 
142 Cf. Ann Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 721, 723, 772 (2004) 
(pointing out that that trademark law has developed on the basis of “personal intuition and 
subjective, internalized stereotypes,” not on “specific and persuasive evidence about consumer 
behavior”).  
143 Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc.,724 F.2d 327 (2d Cir. 1983). 
144 Louboutin II, 696 F.3d at 226. 
145 It seems that the court in Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc. decided on whether 
secondary meaning had been acquired in unnecessary haste:  
The symbols on the “General Lee” just as clearly have a secondary meaning in the 
eyes of the consumer of the toy car. There was ample evidence—indeed Gay Toys' 
sales of its imitations are themselves proof—that the public did associate the 
“General Lee” with the “Dukes of Hazzard” television series. Its distinctive 
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Against this backdrop, the Second Circuit did not point out that the District 
Court had erroneously ignored the need to apply the secondary meaning doctrine. 
Nor did the Circuit Court provide sufficient analysis of the effectiveness of 
Louboutin’s promotional efforts in creating secondary meaning. In the single 
passage quoted above, the Second Circuit did not explain why Louboutin’s 
advertising expenditures, media coverage, and sales success would necessarily lead 
to the creation of secondary meaning.146  For example, regarding sales success, the 
Second Circuit must have noticed that the District Court cited the fact that 240,000 
pairs of shoes were sold in America in a particular year. But what is critical in the 
secondary meaning analysis is “whether the public is moved in any degree to buy 
an article because of its source.”147 Therefore, the Second Circuit should examine 
whether the public’s purchase of Louboutin was motivated by their recognition of 
the red sole as the indicator of Louboutin being the producer the red-soled shoes. 
Like the District Court, the Second Circuit, however, did not consider at all why 
people purchased Louboutin shoes. Was it because people were attracted by the 
Christian Louboutin brand only, or by the overall design of its shoes? Or was it 
because consumers were motivated to buy on the basis of their mental association 
between the red sole and Louboutin shoes? In other words, the Second Circuit 
should have responded specifically to the third question and then considered why 
sales success could show that the red sole mark had acquired secondary meaning in 
the marketplace. It pointed out that unsolicited media attention to the red sole mark 
had become rampant, but it did not discuss whether Christian Louboutin had 
furnished any data to show the extent of media coverage. Worse still, it did not 
consider whether media coverage was actually effective in helping Christian 
Louboutin acquire secondary meaning.  
Another issue the Louboutin courts failed to deal with was whether a 
heightened evidentiary burden should be placed on Louboutin. As discussed above, 
the more descriptive a mark is, the greater the evidentiary burden to establish 
                                                                                                                                        
markings and color made it a “Dukes of Hazzard” car, or a toy depicting that car. It 
is because of that association, the identification of the toy car with its source, 
Warner's television series, that the toy car is bought by the public. That is enough. 
724 F.2d at 334. 
146 See generally, Lee et al., supra note 55, at 1037 (cautioning that courts should treat the 
examination of existence of secondary meaning seriously and arguing that “questions of 
distinctiveness are matters that can and should be informed by the theoretical and empirical tools 
employed by those who undertake a careful, scholarly study of such issues”). 
147 American Footwear Corp. v. General Footwear Co., 609 F.2d 655, 663 (2d Cir.1979). 
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secondary meaning. 148 As YSL counter-argued, “[r]ed outsoles are a commonly 
used ornamental design feature in footwear, dating as far back as the red shoes 
worn by King Louis XIV in the 1600s and the ruby red shoes that carried Dorothy 
home in The Wizard of Oz.”149 The common use of red outsoles may indicate that 
they function to describe certain aesthetic features. Therefore, the Louboutin courts 
should have considered whether the red sole mark was highly descriptive or not.150 
If it was, then Louboutin should have presented more evidence to prove that the 
red sole mark had acquired requisite secondary meaning.  
III 
TOWARD A SOCIAL JUSTICE MANDATE FOR TRADEMARK LAW 
The preceding Part discussed why the Louboutin courts failed to properly 
apply the distinctiveness doctrine to decide whether the red sole mark was 
registrable as a trademark. Without such a crucial consideration, the red sole mark 
may have turned out to be just a mark that has some referential sense but whose 
primary purpose is independent of its source-identifying character. Therefore, a 
rigorous application of the secondary meaning doctrine is crucial to guarantee the 
sensibility of trademark law toward the dynamics of social justice as a public 
policy.  
But what if Christian Louboutin furnished sufficient evidence showing the 
red sole mark has acquired requisite secondary meaning? This Part will argue that 
courts should apply a social justice mandate to override the showing of secondary 
meaning and refuse to uphold the registration of the red sole mark as claimed by 
Louboutin. The application of this mandate would help courts identify any social 
injustices that would be caused by the protection of single color trademarks. The 
Part will further discuss the theoretical and Constitutional basis on which the social 
                                           
148 See supra Part II.A.2. 
149 'You didn't invent red soles': Yves Saint Laurent kicks back at Christian Louboutin, DAILY 
MAIL (May 23, 2011), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-1390229/You-didnt-invent-red-
soles-Yves-Saint-Laurent-kicks-Christian-Louboutin.html. 
150 For discussions on the descriptiveness of color marks, see Kevin M. Jordan & Lynn M. 
Jordan, The Unanswered Question: Can Color Ever Be Inherently Distinctive? 85 TRADEMARK 
REP. 371 (1995); Michael B. Landau, Reconciling Qualitex with Two Pesos: Ambiguity and 
Inconsistency From the Supreme Court, 3 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 219 (1996); James L. Vana, Color 
Trademarks, 7 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 387 (1999); Laura Vistine, Note, The Registrability of 
Color Per Se as a Trademark After Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
611 (1996). 
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justice mandate is founded. It will also address some practical concerns about the 
application of the social justice mandate.   
A. Social Justice as a Policy Concern 
This Section will first show that the registration of the red sole mark has run 
counter to the social justice ethos, causing economic and status injustices. Based 
on this finding, the courts may adopt a social justice mandate, and rule that the red 
sole mark should not be protected as a trademark even if it has acquired source-
identifying secondary meaning.  
1. Economic Injustice  
It should be noted that what motivated Christian Louboutin to bring YSL to 
court was its plan to monopolize the red sole in the footwear industry. Once YSL’s 
use of the red sole is ruled out by the court, any third party’s use of the red sole in 
commerce may trigger the infringement of Christian Louboutin’s color mark 
rights. What makes this monopolization possible is trademark law, which entitles 
Christian Louboutin to prevent others from using the red sole in the commercial 
process of merchandizing shoes. The concept of trademark distinctiveness opened 
the door for that monopolization, because the red sole mark became trademarkable 
once its acquisition of requisite secondary meaning in the market was shown.  
Christian Louboutin is a luxury company that merchandizes its shoes at 
astronomically high prices, ranging from $495 to $6,000.151 Media coverage about 
fashion has been rife with the discussion about how expensive Christian Louboutin 
shoes are.  It was reported that a pair of Lady Spiked Leopard-Print Platform 
Pumps with a 5 3/4-inch heel cost $1,595,152 a pair of black boots $2,645,153 and a 
pair of crystal-encrusted shoes $6,000.154 Journalists and online commentators 
complain about high prices in a whimsical vein. For example, a New York Times 
                                           
151 See Sharyn Alfonsi & Nikki Battiste, Red Sole Man: Christian Louboutin's Signature 
Shoe Has Made Him an Icon, ABC NEWS (Nov. 18, 2011), abcnews.go.com/Business/red-sole-
man-christian-louboutins-signature-shoe-made/story?id=14983446. 
152 See Eric Wilson, Going Toe-to-Toe in Stilettos, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2013, at E1. 
available at www.nytimes.com/2013/06/20/fashion/shoe-battles-going-toe-to-toe-in-stilettos. 
html?ref=style&_r=0. 
153 See Charlotte Cowles, Christian Louboutin on Why Shoes Are So Damn Expensive These 
Days, N.Y. MAG. (June 20, 2013), www.nymag.com/thecut/2013/06/louboutin-on-why-shoes-
are-so-damn-expensive.html. 
154 See Alfonsi & Battiste, supra note 151. 
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essay lamented that “Versions of [Louboutin] shoes in exotic skins, like crocodile, 
can cost as much as $4,645, which, it is strange to say, is anything but exceptional 
in this world.”155 
Unsurprisingly, a direct consequence of red-sole monopolization is that 
other fashion houses and ordinary shoe makers will not be allowed to use red soles 
on the bottoms of their shoes. This will lead to an indirect consequence, that 
medium- or low-income people will not be able to purchase and consume red-soled 
shoes since the red-soled shoes are all priced very high after they are attached to 
the red color mark and the Christian Louboutin word mark.  
The economic injustice caused by the red-sole trademark carries two major 
implications. On a legal level, the red-sole trademark would deprive the poor or 
even middle-income people of the privilege of buying/wearing shoes with red 
soles. Louboutin’s red sole trademark would prohibit any other shoe maker from 
making shoes with red soles or even clothes and handbags imprinted with pictures 
of non-Louboutin red-soled shoes. Any use of the red sole, in this context, would 
trigger violation of trademark law, thanks to the likelihood of confusion doctrine156 
or the trademark dilution doctrine.157 When Christian Louboutin dominates the 
market with its trademark power, no other shoe makers are allowed to make and 
sell shoes with red soles. Poor women will not be able to buy cheap shoes with red 
soles. Poor men will not be able to afford to gift their beloved women with shoes 
with red soles. If poor persons desire to own red-soled shoes, they will have to save 
                                           
155 Wilson, supra note 152. 
156 This doctrine holds that even if consumers are not confused at the point of sale as to the 
true source of the goods, other consumers may be confused as to the source of those goods after 
the sale. In Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade Co., the Court claimed that “[t]he 
likelihood of confusion test concerns not only potential purchasers but also the general public.” 
113 F.3d 373, 382 (2d Cir. 1997). A brand’s reputation for exclusiveness is damaged by post-
sale confusion—the damage to the original brand owner in such a case is that consumers could 
acquire the prestige value of the luxury product by buying and using counterfeits or knockoffs. 
Even though the knowledgeable buyer knew that he/she was getting an imitation third parties 
would be confused. Therefore, consumers may be discouraged from purchasing genuine luxury-
branded goods, as the brands seem to be too commonplace and no longer possess the prestige 
and social status associated with them. In Ferrari S.P.A. Eservizio v Roberts, the court noted that 
“Ferrari intentionally limits production of its cars in order to create an image of exclusivity” and 
if there are many vehicles out in the market, they will no longer be unique. 944 F.2d 1235, 1237 
(6th Cir. 1991).  
157 Anti-dilution is a form of trademark protection that guards against blurring the 
distinctiveness of brands and tarnishing the reputation of brands. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006). 
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up for a long while while sacrificing spending on other goods in order to afford a 
pair of Louboutin shoes. Alternatively, they can put their red-sole dreams on hold, 
aspire to become rich first, achieve wealth, and then buy Louboutin shoes as a 
declaration of their finally being rich. But how many poor people can achieve that 
in contemporary American society with its increased concentration of social wealth 
among the top 1 percent158 while the laws are being changed increasingly in favor 
of big companies like Christian Louboutin?159 
Moreover, on the ethical level, the red-sole trademark would legitimize 
egoist luxury spending behavior without due regard to the suffering of the poor. By 
upholding the red-sole trademark registration, the court signaled its implicit 
endorsement of pricey red-soled shoes that can only be merchandized by Christian 
Louboutin. Because luxury goods protected by trademarks only target people with 
deep pockets, it makes sense for luxury companies like Christian Louboutin to 
exclude those who still struggle for bread and butter from owning red-soled shoes. 
One may point out that this pure economic or monetary calculation is fine when 
trademark law is applied in its literal sense, but it may not be as permissible if 
ethical considerations are channeled into the legal analysis. Ethically speaking, is it 
still fine that as long as Louboutin has acquired secondary meaning, the red-sole 
color mark should be trademarked as a symbol catering only to the rich? Many 
people may respond in the negative. The judicial recognition of the red-sole 
trademark, in fact, has caused a profound ethical consequence. It will translate into 
an implicit endorsement of the luxury strategy that makes red-soled shoes 
“patently, obscenely, even self-destructively overpriced.”160 Consequently, other 
                                           
158 See, e.g., G. William Domhoff, Wealth, Income, and Power, WHO RULES AMERICA? (Feb. 
2013), www2.ucsc.edu/whorulesamerica/power/wealth.html (“In the United States, wealth is 
highly concentrated in a relatively few hands. As of 2010, the top 1% of households (the upper 
class) owned 35.4% of all privately held wealth, and the next 19% (the managerial, professional, 
and small business stratum) had 53.5%, which means that just 20% of the people owned a 
remarkable 89%, leaving only 11% of the wealth for the bottom 80% (wage and salary 
workers)”). 
159 See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising 
Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717, 1727 (1999) (“There has been inexorable pressure to recognize as an 
axiom the principle that if something appears to have substantial value to some, the law must and 
should protect it as property.”). 
160 Wilson, supra note 152 (“The designer shoe industry, to some extent, relies on the willful 
suspension of rational thinking, the giving over to a more primal urge (to shop, that is) in order to 
move merchandise that common sense would suggest is patently, obscenely, even self-
destructively overpriced.”). 
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shoe makers’ attempts to lower the prices of red-soled shoes for low-or-middle-
income people by making and selling them without the Christian Louboutin tag 
would be penalized as a violation of trademark law.  
2. Status Injustice  
Apart from the economic injustice as discussed above, Louboutin’s 
monopolistic control of the red sole mark would also cause status injustice. When 
Christian Louboutin sued YSL, it bluntly asserted: 
Louboutin actively polices the Red Sole Mark to shut down copyists. 
This task will become impossible if competitors can copy the Red Sole 
Mark at will, as YSL has done here. Already another competitor has 
signaled its intent to follow suit. A flood of red soles in high fashion 
women’s footwear creates the danger that Louboutin’s goodwill, 
market prominence and fame will be destroyed, thus threatening its 
entire business.161 
This statement, however, begs the question why Christian Louboutin as a 
commercial entity only desires to use red-soles to serve rich and famous people. 
The reason is very simple. Louboutin has marketed the red sole by adding the 
luxury aura to the energy and passion signaled by the color red. The red sole, 
therefore, is elevated as a luxury symbol for a luxury company that caters to the 
rich and famous.  
Conspicuous consumption describes the behavior of consuming luxury 
goods where less expensive substitutes bring the same or even higher functional 
utilities. Rich people showcase their pecuniary strength through conspicuous 
consumption to affirm their social status. To explain the relationship between 
luxury goods and conspicuous consumption, Thorstein Veblen argued that it is not 
the accumulation of wealth that confers status but the evidence of wealth which 
                                           
161 Plaintiffs’ Reply Memorandum Of Law In Support Of Application For A Preliminary 
Injunction at 9, Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 445 
(No. 11 Civ. 2381 (VM)), available at trademarkem.com/docs/2011-07-19-Louboudin-reply.pdf. 
As commentators point out, “Louboutin … argued that if an injunction is not issued the 
floodgates will open to competitors.  Presumably this will result in the non-rich and famous 
being able to purchase shoes with red soles.  Once this style is available to the common unkempt 
masses, Louboutin’s signature style will be forever tarnished.” Court Rules Louboutin's Red 
Soles are Fashion, not a Trademark, TRADEMARK ‘EM (Sept. 3, 2011), trademarkem.com/court-
rules-louboutins-red-soles-are-fashion-not-a-trademark. 
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requires its wasteful exhibition.162 The possession of luxury goods which are 
priced much higher than their non-luxury equivalents connotes affluence and 
generates superiority as consumers consider themselves one of the few who can 
afford the goods.163 
Conspicuous consumption has been highlighted as a major selling point in 
modern luxury merchandising. Luxury companies use high prices as a marker of 
quality, craftsmanship, and design of their products, and limit possession of luxury 
goods to those who can afford them. Therefore, they allow their customers to 
publicly signal their status in society and to gain the esteem of others.164  The 
registration of the red sole as a trademark has entrenched this mark as part of the 
conspicuous consumption of luxury goods.  
While price connotes social status, price itself, however, does not determine 
the desirability of a brand.165 Consumers have the propensity to associate a 
particular brand with the “type” of consumers who buys that brand.166 Louboutin 
can monopolize the red-sole and dominate the red-sole market serving the likes of 
Wall Street and Hollywood. During the litigation against YSL, Christian 
Louboutin flaunted a long list of celebrities who had been his loyal consumers.167 
                                           
162 THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS 63-64 (Oxford University Press 
2007). 
163 See Richard T. Garfein, Cross-cultural Perspectives on the Dynamics of Prestige, 3 J. 
SERVICES MARKETING 17, 18 (1989). 
164 E.g., Young Jee Han, Joseph C. Nunes & Xavier Drèze, Signaling Status with Luxury 
Goods: The Role of Brand Prominence, 74 J. MARKETING 15 (2010), available at   
https://msbfile03.usc.edu/digitalmeasures/jnunes/intellcont/Brand%20Prominence%201-12-10-
1.pdf. 
165 See, e.g., Birger Wernerfelt, Advertising Content When Brand Choice is a Signal, 63 J. 
BUS. 91, (Jan. 1990) . 
166 Albert M. Muniz & Thomas C. O’Guinn, Brand Community, 27 J. CONSUMER RES. 412 
(March 2001). 
167 Declaration in Support of Acquired Distinctiveness Under Section 2(f) at 2, Louboutin I, 
778 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) [hereinafter Louboutin Declaration], available at 
http://www.counterfeitchic.com/Images/Louboutin%202f%20statement%20in%20trademark%2
0application.pdf  (“My shoes are worn by many famous actresses, musicians and other 
celebrities including royalties. In the U.S., famous wearers of the CHRISTIAN LOUBOUTIN 
red-soled shoes include Madonna, Halley Berry, Salma Hayek, Kate Hudson, Jennifer Lopez, 
Sarah Jessica Parker, Mishca Barton, Jessica Simpson, Mary Kate Olsen, Carmeron Diaz, 
Gwyneth Paltrow, Kirsten Dunst, Angelina Jolie, Gwen Stefani, Destine's Child, Tina Turner and 
Janet Jackson. Other celebrities who wear the red-soled CHRISTIAN LOUBOUTIN shoes 
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The message is very clear: wear Louboutin high heels with red-soles, and you will 
be seen by the public as a member of the Wall Street and Hollywood elite. From 
this perspective, the red sole has become a public passport to allow people to 
declare their affiliation with Wall Street and Hollywood. 
While the red sole is reserved only for the rich to show off their wealth and 
status, 168 the judicial validation of the red-sole mark will be an ethical failure. It 
highlights the stark contrast between the rich and the poor, mirrored by a luxury 
economy where luxury stores shine bright in the centers of major cities that 
nonetheless struggle with high income inequality. Luxury capitals like New 
York,169 London,170 and Hong Kong171 have prospered as their poverty rates and 
                                                                                                                                        
include Diane von Furstenberg, Nicole Kidman, Catherine Deveuve, Cate Blanchett and Princess 
of Caroline of Monaco.”). 
168 See Collins, supra note 65, at 1 (“Like Louis XIV’s red heels, they signal a sort of 
sumptuary code, promising a world of glamour and privilege.”). 
169 Same Roberts, Income Data Shows Widening Gap Between New York City’s Richest and 
Poorest, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2012,  at A22, available at,  
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/20/nyregion/rich-got-richer-and-poor-poorer-in-nyc-2011-
data-shows.html?smid=tw-nytmetro&seid=auto&_r=0 (“The rich got richer and the poor got 
poorer in New York City [in 2011] as the poverty rate reached its highest point in more than a 
decade, and the income gap in Manhattan, already wider than almost anywhere else in the 
country, rivaled disparities in sub-Saharan Africa.”). 
170See Carla Power, Great Divide: How the City of London Widened the Gap between 
Britain's Rich and Poor, TIME MAG. (May 14, 2012),  http://www.time.com/time/magazine 
/article/0,9171,2113703,00.html#ixzz2PxwVA5W0 (“With 95% of the neighborhood's children 
living in poverty, the area ranks among England's poorest. Half a kilometer away is St. John's 
Wood, home to bankers, football managers and former Beatle Paul McCartney. … With the top 
10% of the population worth 273 times the bottom 10%, London ranks as one of the most 
unequal cities in the developed world, trumping even New York City, notes Danny Dorling, an 
expert in urban inequality at the University of Sheffield.”); Clara Ferreira-Marques & Kate 
Holton, Rich and Poor: London's tale of two cities, REUTERS (Apr. 12, 2010), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/04/12/us-britain-election-poverty-
idUSTRE63B57620100412 (“Residents of the decaying Robin Hood Gardens estate, where 
grimy windows punctuate concrete, prison-like corridors, say they feel no connection with those 
living a short walk away in the luxury Canary Riverside complex.”). 
171 See  In Wealthy Hong Kong, the Poorest Residents Live in Metal Cages, N.Y. DAILY 
NEWS (Feb. 10, 2013), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/wealthy-hong-kong-poorest-
live-metal-cages-article-1.1258661 (“For many of the richest people in Hong Kong, one of 
Asia’s wealthiest cities, home is a mansion with an expansive view from the heights of Victoria 
Peak. For some of the poorest, like Leung Cho-yin, home is a metal cage.”); Benjamin Gottlieb 
& Kristie Hang, Hong Kong's poorest living in 'coffin homes’, CNN (July 26, 2011), 
http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/asiapcf/07/25/hongkong.coffin.homes/index.html 
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luxury-spending rise, resulting in the coexistence of slums and luxury stores. 
Beneath this worsening economic inequality lies an ethical crisis. This ethical 
crisis is caused by rich luxury consumers’ indifference to the sufferings of poor 
people. Luxury goods are by no means necessary goods for survival.172 No luxury 
consumer would die or suffer physically if he or she stopped purchasing or 
consuming luxury goods. But the diversion of money from purchasing luxury 
goods to aiding the poor could yield profound humanitarian benefits. In 2011, the 
rich spent $250 billion in total on luxury goods.173 In the same year, around 15 
million children died from hunger.174 Against this backdrop, I raised a question in a 
recent article about whether many luxury consumers are civilized enough to call 
themselves human beings based on their sensitivity, and insensitivity, to the 
suffering of the poor.175 
3. The Application of the Social Justice Mandate 
To address the economic and status injustices caused by the registration of 
the red-sole trademark, a social justice mandate should be incorporated into the 
judicial scrutiny of the distinctiveness of marks. Courts can apply it to override the 
acquired distinctiveness of a mark if the trademark protection of the mark would 
cause social injustice.  
                                                                                                                                        
(“Through Mak's eyes, there are two Hong Kongs: The one seen through his only window, 
personified by the glitz and glamour the city is famous for. And the one inside, that has allowed 
less fortunate citizens to fall through the cracks.”). 
172 Pierre Bourdieu divides consumption of goods with two kinds of tastes: “the tastes of 
luxury’ and “the tastes of necessity.” PIERRE BOURDIEU, DISTINCTION: A SOCIAL CRITIQUE OF 
THE JUDGEMENT OF TASTE 175 (1984). Bourdieu also observes that the working-class lifestyle is 
characterized by both “the absence of luxury goods, whisky or paintings, champagne or concerts, 
cruises or art exhibitions, caviar or antiques" and by "the presence of numerous cheap substitutes 
for these rare goods . . . .” Id. at 386. 
173 BAIN & CO., LUXURY GOODS WORLDWIDE MARKET STUDY 3 (10th ed. 2011), available at 
www.slideshare.net/Ikusmer/luxury-goods-worldwide-market-study. 
174 World Hunger Statistics, STATISTIC BRAIN (May 7, 2013),  www.statisticbrain.com/world-
hunger-statistics/. 
175 Haochen Sun, Can Louis Vuitton Dance with HiPhone? Rethinking the Idea of Social 
Justice in Intellectual Property Law, 15 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 389, 432 (2012) (“Although 
social justice is a value central to humanity and civilization, we live in an unequal society 
polarized by the unfair distribution of resources. People still live in poverty and even die from 
the lack of food. Other people, however, are rich enough to shop happily in luxury stores without 
regard for those who die of hunger. This stark contrast questions whether luxury consumers are 
civilized enough to call ourselves human beings or instead lack the ability to sense the pain of 
our peers.”). 
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The Second Circuit ruled that Christian Louboutin had acquired secondary 
meaning over the red-sole contrasted with “the remainder of the shoe.”176 
Therefore it could only have trademark protection over “the contrast between the 
sole and the upper [portion of the shoe].”177 But this ruling did not invalidate the 
red sole trademark at all. Instead, it still preserves trademark protection over the 
red-sole. At this point, the Second Circuit added that “Louboutin has not 
established secondary meaning in an application of a red sole to a red shoe. . . . The 
use of a red lacquer on the outsole of a red shoe of the same color is not a use of 
the Red Sole Mark.”178 Therefore, the Second Circuit only deprived Christian 
Louboutin of its trademark rights over the red sole use on a red shoe. It kept the 
door open for Louboutin to claim trademark rights over the use of the red-sole on 
shoes of any color other than red.  
The application of the social justice mandate, however, would reverse the 
Second Circuit’s decision. Social justice should be a factor that can override the 
finding of acquired distinctiveness through the secondary meaning inquiry. As 
discussed above, the red-sole mark carries social justice consequences.179 From 
this perspective, the Louboutin courts have also failed to consider the social justice 
issues that should be integrated into their scrutiny of the distinctiveness of the red-
sole mark. Although the battle was waged between two luxury companies, 
Christian Louboutin and YSL, the litigation has the potential to have tremendous 
impacts on other fashion companies and particularly consumers.  
Therefore, the application of social mandate reflects the fact that weighing 
the distinctiveness of a mark always has an impact on other relevant marks and 
their consumers. As Professor Barton Beebe points out, “[I]t is … a mark’s 
distinctiveness from other marks, its salience, that makes consumers aware of it 
and that will affect whether consumers are likely to confuse it with a junior, similar 
mark.”180 Following this mandate, courts should not simply isolate the scrutiny of 
distinctiveness to a mark itself. Rather, they should consider the larger impact of 
protecting a distinctive mark on other marks and their consumers.  
For example, courts should note that the trademark protection of the red-sole 
mark may cause serious social injustices. If the red-sole is trademarkable, should 
                                           
176 Louboutin II, 696 F.3d 206, 225 (2d Cir. 2012). 
177 Id. at 227. 
178 Id. at 228. 
179 See supra Part III.A.1-2. 
180 Beebe, supra note 28, at 672. 
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we also protect red collars and cuffs that may acquire secondary meaning after 
being strenuously marketed? The same question applies to other colors that are 
basic ingredients of fashion design181 and marketing.182 From this perspective, the 
trademark protection of the red sole may open a floodgate for increasingly 
allowing simple fashion symbols to be protected as luxury brands, leading to 
greater social injustices.  
Moreover, courts should consider the social justice implications of granting 
trademark protection in non-fashion contexts. Can Facebook register the blue, long 
stripe that constantly appears on its website and has become a “distinctive” feature 
of Facebook operation? The same question can be raised for CNN’s extensive use 
of the red stripe for its website operation.183 In this context, courts must vigilantly 
consider from the social justice perspective whether single color marks of that type 
merit trademark protection even if they have acquired sufficient secondary 
meaning.   
                                           
181 Fashion houses often use “color stories” to offer new fashion designs. Color stories are the 
“selected colors that signal the personality of the collection.” EVELYN L. BRANNON, FASHION 
FORECASTING 156 (2d ed. 2005). 
182 Research has revealed that color plays a defining role in the fashion industry. For 
instance, in the survey on consumer’s perception on color, consumers were interviewed for 
choosing colors that represent “high quality” of products. 43% of the consumers chose black and 
20% chose blue. Thus, it shows that color has a close relationship with people’s cognitive 
perceptions of fashion products. See FABER BIRREN, COLOR PSYCHOLOGY AND COLOR THERAPY 
(Citadel 1978); see also Akiko Fukai, The Colors of a Period as the Embodiment of Dreams, in 
FASHION IN COLORS 12, 15 (Esther Kremer ed., 2005) (“When we choose the clothes that we 
wear, we are fully convinced that we are selecting the colors that we like. However, in 
examining the eternal theme of color, it is evident that our color choices are made within the 
restrictions of a certain period. That is to say, we are limited to the choices offered by the market 
at any given time; after all, the market itself is strictly controlled by the economics of fashion 
trends and the structure of the industry.”); Sunila Sreepada, The New Black: Trademark 
Protection for Color Marks in the Fashion Industry, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. 
L.J. 1131, 1145 (2009) (“Colors generate specific associations in the minds of consumers that 
can be harnessed by sellers to influence decision making in the marketplace.”). 
183 John Villasenor, Can a Company Trademark the Colors On Its Web Site?, FORBES (Sept. 
15, 2012),  www.forbes.com/sites/johnvillasenor/2012/09/15/can-a-company-trademark-the-
colors-on-its-web-site/ (“Consider the thick, red, horizontal stripe at the top of CNN’s web site. 
A person seeing a computer from the other side of a room who might not be able to read the print 
on the screen would nonetheless be likely to recognize that it was displaying a page from the 
cnn.com domain. In the context of online news sites, CNN’s red stripe placed across the top of 
the screen plays an important role in brand identification.”). 
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There are two ways in which the court can apply the social justice mandate. 
First, the mandate allows a defendant to assert social justice factors to request a 
court disprove or override the distinctiveness of a mark.  If the court can identify 
the specific social injustices (economic and status injustice as revealed above) 
based on the evidence submitted by the defendant, it can invalidate the registration 
of a mark like the red-sole mark, unless its owner furnishes further evidence to 
refute the allegations that the mark runs counter to the social justice mandate. 
Alternatively, the court may opt to protect a mark in a different manner that is less 
likely to perpetuate social injustice. For example, the court can protect the red sole 
color mark only when it is used together with the “Christian Louboutin” word 
mark. This option only recognizes that the red sole mark has acquired secondary 
meaning when it is combined with the “Christian Louboutin” word mark. 
Therefore, the use of the red sole mark by others with their own brands would not 
trigger infringement liability.  
B. The Legal Basis of the Social Justice Mandate 
This Section will explore the legal basis for channeling the social justice 
mandate in the judiciary scrutiny of trademark distinctiveness. It will demonstrate 
that the application of this mandate not only fits with the traditional trademark 
practice but also with liberal justice theory and Constitutional mandates.  
1.  Taking Precedents Seriously 
The precedents that the Louboutin courts followed, in fact, left room for 
courts to use the social justice mandate. The Louboutin courts heavily relied on 
Supreme Court’s Qualitex decision in determining whether a single color is 
protectable as a trademark. But the Louboutin court neglected to take advantage of 
a crucial opportunity that the Supreme Court noted in Qualitex. In that decision, 
the Supreme Court considered whether a green-gold color mark constituted a 
symbol, and whether it had acquired the requisite secondary meaning, if protecting 
the trademark prevented competitors from using a necessary functional aspect.184 
The Court concluded by noting that “unless there is some special reason that 
convincingly militates against the use of color alone as a trademark, trademark law 
would protect Qualitex's use of the green-gold color on its press pads.”185 
Following this statement, the Supreme Court proceeded to examine whether there 
were any additional “special reason[s]” for invalidating the mark concerned. The 
                                           
184 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 166 (1995). 
185 Id. 
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Court considered whether the protection of single colors would result in shade 
confusion, making it difficult for courts to settle color-related trademark cases.186 It 
also considered whether single color trademarks would cause color depletion in 
ways that no alternative colors are left for competitors to use in a particular 
industry.187 Only after reviewing these two additional issues did the Court affirm 
the validity of the green-gold mark concerned. Therefore, it is clear that the 
Supreme Court allows lower courts to use additional policy factors to determine 
the trademarkability of single color marks.  
Moreover, the Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of public 
policy in deciding difficult trademark cases. In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara 
Bros.,188 the Supreme Court dealt with the tough question as to whether trade 
dresses should be treated as inherently distinctive or need to acquire secondary 
meaning to warrant trademark protection. At the end of its decision, the Court 
highlighted the “great consumer benefit”189 that would be derived from requiring a 
showing of secondary meaning of a trade dress. The social justice mandate centers 
on consumer benefits. The mandate is intended to protect more consumers from the 
harms caused by the registration of single color marks. Therefore, it is a policy-
oriented factor commensurate with the consumer benefit test.190 
Last but not least, courts have carved out the heightened evidentiary 
requirement necessitated by the social justice mandate. As single color marks are 
highly descriptive marks, owners of such marks, according to some courts, are 
required to shoulder a heavier burden of proof. For example, the court in In re 
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., a landmark color mark decision, required that the 
evidence submitted by the applicant must be substantial because “by their very 
nature color marks carry a difficult burden in demonstrating distinctiveness and 
                                           
186 Id. at 167. 
187 Id. at 168-69. 
188 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000). 
189 Id. at 215 (“To the extent there are close cases, we believe that courts should err on the 
side of caution and classify ambiguous trade dress as product design, thereby requiring 
secondary meaning. The very closeness will suggest the existence of relatively small utility in 
adopting an inherent-distinctiveness principle, and relatively great consumer benefit in requiring 
a demonstration of secondary meaning.”).  
190 Brown, supra note 2, at 1167 (“[W]hat appear to be private disputes among hucksters 
almost invariably touch the public welfare. We shall therefore be concerned to ask, when courts 
protect trade symbols, whether their decisions further public as well as private goals.”); Litman, 
supra note 159, at 1728 (“[T]he essence of [trademark law] is to divide . . . the valuable stuff 
that, precisely because of its importance, is reserved for public use.”). 
184 N.Y.U. JOURNAL OF INTELL. PROP. & ENT. LAW [Vol. 3:142 
trademark character.”191 The Federal Circuit applied Third Circuit law to drive 
home the point that claimed owners of single color marks should present more 
evidence of secondary meaning than mere long-time use and advertising.192  
2. Taking the American Legal Tradition Seriously 
The social justice mandate, as discussed above, is in line with Supreme 
Court trademark jurisprudence and practical rules adopted by lower courts. 
Meanwhile, the mandate also reflects the equality principle that undergirds the 
American legal system. 
i. Social Justice as a Fundamental Value  
 It is widely recognized that all human beings are equal individuals with 
equal worth.193 Nevertheless, disparities exist in all modern societies. For example, 
income inequality exists in many societies and continues to worsen.194 Against this 
backdrop, social justice has been championed as a human value to minimize the 
impact unequal distribution of resources has on the disadvantaged. The following 
statement by John Rawls captures the essence of social justice as a fundamental 
human value: 
Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of 
thought. A theory however elegant and economical must be rejected or 
revised if it is untrue; likewise laws and institutions no matter how 
                                           
191 In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1125, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 1985) 
(holding that section 2(f) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) and thus leaving the 
determination of the degree of proof necessary to demonstrate distinctiveness to the judgment of 
the Patent Office and the courts). 
192 ERBE Elektromedizin GmbH v. Canady Tech. LLC, 629 F.3d 1278, 1290-91 (Fed. Cir. 
2010). 
193 E.g., Article 1 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights states that, “[a]ll human 
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and 
conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.” Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III), at 72 (Dec. 10, 1948). 
194 See Ilyana Kuziemko & Stefanie Stantcheva, Our Feelings About Inequality: It’s 
Complicated, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2013), opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/21/our-
feelings-about-inequality-its-complicated/?ref=opinion (“Since the 1970s, income inequality in 
the United States has increased at a historic rate. In 1970, the richest 1 percent of Americans 
enjoyed 9 percent of total national pre-tax income. In 2011, by contrast, that share had risen to 
19.8 percent.”).  
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efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are 
unjust.195 
Hailed as a fundamental human value, social justice measures the degree of 
inequality a society accommodates through its institutions. According to Rawls, 
social justice has two major principles. Called the equal liberty principle, the first 
principle directs that “each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive 
basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others.”196 The second principle 
of social justice has two sub-principles. The first one is called the difference 
principle. It dictates that social inequalities are justified if and only if they work to 
the benefit of the least advantaged in society.197 The second sub-principle, labeled 
the equal opportunity principle, requires that “offices and positions must be open to 
everyone under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.”198  
The Rawlsian theory lends strong support to the incorporation of social 
justice into the secondary meaning inquiry. First, it places social justice as a 
supreme value to assess the legitimacy of institutional decisions and rules. 
Embodied with this supreme value, the social justice mandate can be used as the 
final arbiter in deciding whether a single color mark should be granted trademark 
protection. 
Second, the difference principle highlights the distributive concerns that 
judges must consider. Rawls suggests several ways of defining the most 
disadvantaged group.199 An easy way, as he emphasizes, is to consider an 
individual’s “place in the distribution of income and wealth.”200 This 
                                           
195 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3 (rev. ed. 1999). 
196 Id. at 53. 
197 Id. at 65 (stating that “the higher expectations of those better situated are just if and only if 
they work as part of a scheme which improves the expectations of the least advantaged members 
of society”). Rawls pointed out that “social order is not to establish and secure the more 
attractive prospects of those better off unless doing so is to the advantage of those less 
fortunate.” Id. Applying the principle to the “likely medical needs” of the least advantaged, 
Rawls stated that “[w]ithin the guidelines of the difference principle, provisions [of medicines] 
can be made for covering these needs up to the point where further provision would lower the 
expectations of the least advantaged.” JOHN RAWLS,  JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 173 
(Erin Kelly ed., 2001). 
198 RAWLS, supra note 195, at 47. 
199 Id. at 82 (“I suppose, then, that for the most part each person holds two relevant positions: 
that of equal citizenship and that defined by his place in the distribution of income and wealth.”). 
200 Id.; see also Philippe Van Parijs, Difference Principles, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION 
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characterization of the most disadvantaged group is “in terms of relative income 
and [wealth] with no reference to social positions.  For example, all persons with 
less than half the median may be regarded as the least advantaged segment.”201 
Applying the difference principle, judges may consider that the protection of single 
color marks should function to provide benefits to the least advantaged citizens in 
terms of their incomes. Therefore, the social justice mandate would require 
Christian Louboutin to furnish evidence to prove that the protection of the red sole 
mark would benefit poor people.   
ii.  Social Justice as a Constitutional Value 
Moreover, the social justice mandate comports with the constitutional 
tradition in America. The Preamble of the Constitution highlights the need to 
establish social justice and promote public welfare: “[w]e the People of the United 
States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic 
Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and 
secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity . . . .”202 The ethos of 
social justice is further carried forward in the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Watershed constitutional decisions that have reshaped the 
political and social landscape of the country have relied upon the idea of social 
justice to apply the Equal Protection Clause203 in politically hostile social 
conditions. For example, in Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court 
declared state laws establishing separate public schools for black and white 
students unconstitutional.204 In Loving v. Virginia, the Supreme Court invalidated 
laws prohibiting interracial marriage.205 By championing the cause of social 
justice, these cases denounced not only laws but also social attitudes that supported 
“the inferiority of the negro group”206 or white supremacy based on “invidious 
                                                                                                                                        
TO RAWLS 200, 212 (Samuel R. Freeman ed., 2003). 
201 RAWLS, supra note 195, at 84. 
202 U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
203 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
204 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
205 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
206 Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 (“Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has 
a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of 
the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of 
the negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with 
the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental development 
of negro children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] 
integrated school system.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). 




It is true that the protection of the red sole mark does not impose legal 
barriers preventing the poor from buying and owning red-soled shoes. After all, 
red-soled Louboutin shoes are circulated in the market and made available to 
whoever can afford them. The trademark protection of the red sole, therefore, does 
not “racially” discriminate against the poor who cannot afford Louboutin shoes. 
But one should note that what the Brown and Loving courts intended to eradicate 
were the social disorder that first determined people’s attitudes toward their 
perceived-inferior peers and then transformed their attitudes into racially 
discriminatory laws. Similarly, there is a social disorder underlying the protection 
of the red sole mark. The social disorder has encouraged people to privilege the 
rich “angels” who can afford Louboutin shoes in the fashion paradise and 
disprivilege the poor “devils” who only deserve to wear black-soled shoes in the 
non-fashion hell. The earlier discussion about the economic and status injustices 
(especially the conspicuous consumption point) caused by the red sole mark has 
evinced that simmering social disease.208 Hence, this social disorder should at least 
be morally blamed for establishing a new practice of social profiling based on 
personal wealth or the ability to buy luxury goods.  
Moreover, the freedom of expression protected by the First Amendment 
supports the social justice mandate. The First Amendment protects the equal 
liberty to have public spaces to perform free speeches.209 Central to the public 
forum doctrine is the notion that resources used for speech must be held as public 
property for the general welfare of the people at large.210 Public properties such as 
                                           
207 Loving, 388 U.S. at 11 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“There is patently no legitimate 
overriding purpose independent of invidious racial discrimination which justifies [the ban on 
inter-racial marriage]. The fact that Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages involving white 
persons demonstrates that the racial classifications must stand on their own justification, as 
measures designed to maintain White Supremacy.”). 
208 See supra Part III.A.1-2. 
209 Rebecca Tushnet, Domain and Forum: Public Space, Public Freedom, 30 COLUM. J.L. & 
ARTS 597, 600 (2007) (“Public forums allow speech supporting the ‘poorly financed causes of 
little people’ to be disseminated where it is likely to be heard, in public spaces where the public 
often goes.” (quoting Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943)); see also, Philip M. 
Napoli & Sheena T. Sybblis, Access to Audiences as a First Amendment Right: Its Relevance 
and Implications for Electronic Media Policy, 12 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 5 (2007). 
210 Lyrissa Lidsky, Public Forum 2.0, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1975, 2008 (2011) (“The government 
must hold open the traditional forums such as streets and parks for the benefit of speakers who 
would otherwise lack the resources to reach a mass audience.”). 
188 N.Y.U. JOURNAL OF INTELL. PROP. & ENT. LAW [Vol. 3:142 
public squares, parks, beaches, and utility poles, are a “medium of communication 
[that] is particularly valuable.”211 Courts have highlighted the need to make public 
forums equally open to all to exercise the free speech right. According to courts, a 
public forum open for free speech “entails a relatively small expense in reaching a 
wide audience, allows flexibility in accommodating various formats, typographies, 
and graphics, and conveys . . . message[s] in a manner that is easily read and 
understood by [the] reader or viewer.”212  
As a pillar of the American legal tradition, courts have protected intangible 
public forums for conducting speech activities and symbolic speech actions.213 For 
example, Rosenberger v. Rector of the University of Virginia214 found that a public 
university’s student activities fund was a “forum more in a metaphysical than in a 
spatial or geographic sense, but the same principles are applicable.”215 Moreover, 
courts have also protected symbolic speech activities that purposefully and 
discernibly convey a particular message or statement to those viewing them. 
Therefore, wearing black armbands overlaid with a white peace sign216 and waving 
an American flag with the words “America the red, white, and blue, we spit on 
you”217 were protected by the First Amendment as symbolic speech.  
Free speech protection raises two concerns as to whether all Americans 
deserve equal protection to use the red sole as a speech activity. First, shall we treat 
fashion as an intangible public forum where people can express their thoughts and 
comments about many political and social issues and even personal matters? 
Fashion designs or trends are all publicly displayed. Many fashion shows 
communicate political and cultural messages.218 As fashion largely deals with 
                                           
211 Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 819 (1984) (Brennan, 
J., dissenting). 
212 Id.  
213 Tushnet, supra note 209, at 599 (pointing out that “the Supreme Court recognized a 
‘metaphysical’ or intangible public forum”). 
214 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).  
215 Id. at 830. 
216 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
217 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399 (1989). 
218 James Kilner, New York Fashion Week Cancels Show By Uzbek President's Daughter, 
THE TELEGRAPH (Sept. 11, 2011), www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/uzbekistan/ 
8755351/New-York-Fashion-Week-cancels-show-by-Uzbek-presidents-daughter.html 
(“Organisers of New York Fashion Week have cancelled a show by the daughter of Uzbek 
president Islam Karimov after pressure from newspapers and human rights groups who accuse 
him of torture”). 
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creative and artistic ideas, it can be deemed to be an intangible public forum for 
making aesthetic expressions. Against this backdrop, can we privatize the color 
red, a basic ingredient in fashion design,219 as a private property? From the free 
speech protection perspective, such a privatization affects the ability of fashion to 
serve as an intangible public forum.  
Second, a trickier question is whether we can treat wearing red-soled shoes 
as a symbolic speech action that conveys particular meanings and messages. Mr. 
Christian Louboutin has acknowledged that he selected red because it is “the color 
of passion.”220  What then if some Wall Street investment bank analysts and 
associates make red-soled shoes by themselves and wear them to wage a protest 
against their employers’ long-hours working policy that has sapped their passion 
and energy? Does this kind of symbolic speech action using the red sole violate 
trademark law? The color red also conveys anger as a human feeling. If non-
Loubutin red-soled shoes were worn to express anger in similar protest scenarios, 
would this kind of symbolic speech action be penalized by trademark law? A larger 
and thornier question is related to the fact that many women and fashion designers 
have long seen the color red as a conveyor of messages about beauty and fashion 
itself.221 For example, the young Valentino was stricken by “an opera-goer in a red 
velvet dress” in Barcelona, which made him believe that “if [he was] ever going to 
become a designer, [he] would do lots of red.”222 Then how should the trademark 
protection of the red sole deal with this kind of symbolic speech routinely 
performed by women and fashion designers?  
All these questions carry highly sensitive free speech values.  Judges should 
pay attention to the fact that symbolic speech cases mostly involve use of colors.223 
With this hindsight, judges should  realize that they should be vigilant in 
                                           
219 See supra text accompanying notes 181 to 183. 
220 Louboutin Declaration, supra note 167. 
221 See Anita Bhagwandas, Beauty for Darker Skins: The Perfect Red Lipstick, THE 
GUARDIAN (June 24, 2013), www.theguardian.com/fashion/fashion-blog/2013/jun/24/beauty-
darker-skins-red-lipstick (noting that red lipstick has been a beauty trend for centuries). 
222 Valentino, VOGUEPEDIA, www.vogue.com/voguepedia/Valentino (last visited Oct. 29, 
2013). 
223 See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Comty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969) 
(noting, in a symbolic speech case, that “students at one of the high schools were heard to say 
they would wear arm bands of other colors if the black bands prevailed."); see also Texas v. 
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 428 (1989) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that most state statutes 
against burning the American flag, determined by this Court to be symbolic speech, explicitly 
mention color). 
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considering the potential free speech values in the free use of the red sole.  
C. Practical Concerns about the Mandate 
The preceding Section discussed the legal foundation of the social justice 
mandate. This Section will first tackle two practical concerns about whether the 
mandate would sound the death knell for single color marks and the luxury 
industry that heavily relies on trademark protection for business success. It will 
then further consider whether the aesthetic functionality doctrine can address the 
social justice concerns embedded in the mandate.  
1. The Demise of Single Color Marks? 
 The social justice mandate would by no means kill single color trademarks. 
In fact, a normal single color mark would not necessarily cause social injustices. 
During the past decades, courts have approved the use of a single color as a 
trademark for industrial products. For example, green-gold for pads used on dry 
cleaning presses,224 pink for fibrous glass insulation,225 and most recently purple 
for chocolates.226 Products labeled with these single color marks are marketed to 
the mass public. As household products, their prices are relatively low enough so 
that nearly every family can afford them. Unlike luxury products that are 
purposefully designed to cater to the rich, they are available to virtually everybody 
not in palace-like stores but in places such convenience stores and supermarkets. 
Being marketed with this “serving everybody” principle, these single color marks 
may not cause social injustice to the poor. Therefore, the social justice mandate 
would not permit undesirable judicial activism, invalidating single color 
trademarks all the time. 
2. The Demise of the Luxury Industry? 
With its rapid development, the luxury industry has played an important role 
in many modern societies. Economically, it is estimated that global luxury goods 
sales in 2011 reached around $250 billion.227 The luxury industry has long hailed 
intellectual property protection as key to the industry’s success. Representatives 
from the industry always argue that adequate protection of intellectual property 
                                           
224 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 160 (1995). 
225 In re Owens–Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
226 Société Des Produits Nestlé S.A. v. Cadbury UK Ltd., [2012] EWHC (Ch) 2637 (Ch) 
(Eng.) 
227 Han, Nunes & Drèze, supra note 173, at 27.  
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functions to ensure that luxury companies can recoup their investments in the 
creation and dissemination of product design and marketing. But given the very 
weak copyright and patent protection, trademark protection has become core to the 
luxury industry. Anti-confusion protection empowers luxury brands to attempt to 
wipe out counterfeits. Anti-dilution protection serves to preserve and enhance the 
exclusivity and quality reputation that are vital to luxury goods.228  
Therefore, two other practical concerns should be raised as to whether the 
social justice mandate would significantly weaken the luxury industry or even 
cause this industry’s demise in the marketplace. First, it seems that the mandate has 
created an exception only to luxury brands. Second, the mandate may enable fast 
fashion brands to obtain registration of single color marks and then use their 
popularity to eclipse luxury brands.   
As to the first concern, the social justice mandate is not intended to create an 
unfavorable exception applied only to luxury brands. Trademark law, as shown 
above, does protect single color marks. It also protects simple trademarks like the 
Adidas three-stripe and Nike swoosh marks that have appeared in various colors. 
Undoubtedly, all these marks have acquired sufficient distinctiveness. They are 
also used for marketing products to the mass public. As discussed above, these 
marks are far less likely to cause social injustices.229 However, luxury brands are 
different. They are used to market products or services to the rich. To a certain 
extent, they are used to accommodate unequal distribution of social wealth. 
Therefore, the status of luxury brands determines that they should be treated in a 
way different way. Moreover, even if luxury brands like the red sole mark are 
invalidated by the social justice mandate, luxury companies still have other 
powerful trademarks to use in merchandizing their products or services. Christian 
Louboutin still keeps the “Christian Louboutin” word mark, and as long it is used 
together with the red sole, it will signify passion and energy. Last but not least, it 
should be noted that the color red is a basic ingredient of fashion design.230 
Therefore, the trademark protection of red marks including the red sole mark may 
cause more far-reaching impact on the development and dissemination of fashion 
design. By contrast, color combination marks such as the Louis Vuitton monogram 
                                           
228 See Sun, supra note 30, at 402-05.  
229 See id. at 422-34 (arguing that the “shanzhai” phenomenon, as it applies to brands like 
Adidas and Nike, can redistribute resources). 
230 See supra text accompanying notes 181 to 183. 
192 N.Y.U. JOURNAL OF INTELL. PROP. & ENT. LAW [Vol. 3:142 
can be trademarkable. A primary reason, in this context, is that they are no longer 
basic ingredients of fashion design.  
Second, the social justice mandate does not necessarily favor fast fashion 
brands by potentially enabling them to obtain registrations of single color marks. 
Indeed, fast fashion companies like H&M, Forever 21, and Zara have competed 
with luxury companies on various fronts. As fast fashion products are relatively 
cheap, they are affordable products for the mass public. If fast fashion companies 
apply for single color mark protection, they will not be subject to the social justice 
mandate and could obtain registrations of their marks after passing secondary 
meaning muster. Fast companies may then rely on their single color marks to 
prevent luxury companies from using those colors as Louboutin did against its 
luxury peer YSL and lower market competitor Zara. Therefore, the mandate might 
turn the luxury world upside-down by favoring fast fashion brands. 
However, that is an unnecessary concern. First, no fast fashion companies 
would be able to show the requisite secondary meaning of their single color marks. 
Fast fashion is a heavily competitive industry. Copying and being copied are the 
heart and soul of this industry. Once a design element by a fast fashion company is 
fashionable, or has the potential to become fashionable, it will be quickly copied 
and incorporated by other fast fashion companies. Moreover, fast fashion 
companies copy from luxury companies. Therefore, it will be exceedingly 
difficulty for a fast fashion company to prove that one of its design elements has 
created source-identifying secondary meaning informing consumers that it is the 
producer or designer of the design element.  
Moreover, the nature of fast fashion determines that no companies in this 
industry would strategize to fix a red sole–like design element to highlight their 
products. Fast fashion is defined by very rapid changes in trends. Being a trend-
setter with constantly changing new designs is the rule of the game for most fast 
fashion companies. Without any permanent highlighting design elements, fast 
fashion companies will not be able to apply for single color mark protection.   
Lastly, it should be noted that luxury companies still preserve the core 
brands for their business. The 2012 Top 100 Brands ranking highlighted leading 
luxury brands, including Mercedes-Benz, BMW, Louis Vuitton, Gucci, Cartier, 
Tiffany & Co., Porsche, Burberry, Ralph Lauren, Prada, and Ferrari. 231 The 
                                           
231 Best Global Brands 2012, INTERBRAND (2013), www.interbrand.com/en/best-global-
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ranking shows that the value of these brands ranged from approximately $9 to $75 
billion.232  What is central to luxury companies are word marks that directly 
advertise corporate identities to the public.  Subject to the social justice mandate, 
Christian Louboutin would not receive protection of signs like the red sole mark, 
but it still would have full control of the “Christian Louboutin” word mark. 
Moreover, the social justice mandate also gives courts an option to protect the red 
sole mark together with the “Christian Louboutin” word mark.233 If courts opt for 
this combination mark approach, both marks would still be protected by trademark 
law.  
3. The Aesthetic Functionality Doctrine 
The third practical concern is that the social justice mandate may not be 
necessary because the aesthetic functionality doctrine can address the policy 
concerns on its own. According to the aesthetic functionality doctrine,234 a design 
feature merits trademark protection only if it can be shown to perform no 
significant function other than acting “as a symbol that distinguishes a firm’s 
goods and identifies their source.”235 In other words, certain design features may 
be so valuable for facilitating market competition, that it would significantly hinder 
competition if a single manufacturer were granted trademark monopoly over it.236 
An example of aesthetic functionality would be the heart-shaped candy box. The 
heart shape is “an important factor in the appeal of the product” and such 
functionality is both independent from source-identification and important to 
                                           
232 Id. 
233 See Sun, supra note 30, at 411. (suggesting that the social justice mandate allows 
companies to offer products with the same functions as their high-profile counterparts, as long as 
the trademark name (e.g., Apple or Nokia) is not also replicated). 
234 Aesthetic functionality is a subcategory of the functionality doctrine. According to the 
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, “[w]hen aesthetic considerations play an important 
role in the purchasing decisions of prospective consumers, a design feature that substantially 
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(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17, cmt. c (1995). 
235 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 166 (1995). Before Qualitex, the 
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of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article.” Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., 
Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982). 
236 See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 170 (noting that the policy goal of the Qualitex doctrine is to 
protect and advance fair competition in the market by preventing any one entity from claiming 
exclusive ownership over design features that are competitively valuable).  
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effective market competition. Thus, the heart-shaped box is aesthetically functional 
and, consequently, does not qualify for trademark protection.237  
Aesthetic functionality doctrine is not designed to address social justice 
issues directly related to the poor. First, the doctrine does not intend to make a 
design feature relatively affordable. Instead, its primary function is to make design 
features available for producers of goods to compete in the market. The policy goal 
of the doctrine, as recognized by the Supreme Court in its Qualitex decision, is to 
protect and advance fair competition in the market by preventing any one entity 
from claiming exclusive ownership over design features that are competitively 
valuable.238 Indeed, competition is likely to improve quality, or lower the price, of 
goods or services. But it does not guarantee that it would drive the price of a 
particular product to make it relatively affordable for everybody to afford it. In 
some industries, competition would not necessarily bring down prices of products. 
For example, the luxury industry is a highly competitive industry but the overall 
prices of luxury goods remain very high. Because it is designed to promote 
competition, the aesthetic functionality doctrine primarily benefits companies that 
market goods or services.  
Second, it is difficult to apply the doctrine to fashion designs. As the 
Supreme Court noted in TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., where a 
feature is aesthetically functional, its exclusive use must threaten to put 
competitors at a “significant non-reputation-related disadvantage.”239 Therefore, 
under the doctrine the court must find that the anti-competitive consequences of 
granting trademark protection to aesthetically functional features would be 
significant. However, it is unclear what magnitude of aesthetic functionality would 
be considered as “significant.” The Louboutin case proves this difficulty. In 
applying the aesthetic functionality doctrine, the District Court found that the red 
sole served significant non-trademark functions by imbuing the shoes with 
“energy” and a certain sexiness and appeal. 240 In other words, the red sole was 
found to be aesthetically appealing at some unquantifiable level sufficient to 
disqualify it from trademark protection. However, whether “red” may make a 
design sexy and appealing is more a matter of subjective taste rather than being 
objectively judged. On the other hand, it is also difficult to distinguish between 
                                           
237  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17, illus. 8 (1995). 
238  See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 170. 
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reputation-related disadvantages and other competitive disadvantages. This is 
particularly true in the fashion industry, where creativity is difficult to distinguish 
from commercial success, and demand is also difficult to distinguish from 
reputation.241 
Third, where design features are deemed to have acquired secondary 
meaning, it is difficult to prove that any aesthetic appeal they possess is not 
reputation-related in nature. For example, in the Ninth Circuit’s Au-Tomotive Gold 
decision, Audi’s logo of four interlocking rings was claimed to be functional 
because of an “aesthetic quality to the marks that purchasers are interested in 
having.”242 The court, however, determined that “the alleged aesthetic function is 
indistinguishable from and tied to the mark’s source-identifying nature.”243 Akin to 
the Audi case, the Second Circuit in Louboutin had difficulty sorting out the 
secondary meaning of a mark from its functional aspects. The court implied that 
the color red is functional for fashion design.244 However, it still ruled that the 
modified version of the red sole mark, namely the red sole contrasted with the 
upper part of a shoe, had acquired secondary meaning and therefore become 
trademarkable.245 This twist raises an important question: why did the Second 
Circuit uphold the validity of the modified red sole mark even after it determined 
red to be functional for fashion design? A possible answer is that the court may 
have had difficulty distinguishing between the functional and source-identifying 
aspects of the color mark. 
CONCLUSION 
In her seminal book The Second Sex, Simone de Beauvoir points out that 
fashion binds female liberties. Women themselves are not able to define their 
freedom. Instead, it is determined by those who gain the power to design and judge 
fashion.246 In the contemporary world of fashion dominated by giant trademark 
                                           
241 See supra text accompanying notes 5-6. 
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owners, we should ask whether they have the monopoly power to control fast-
evolving fashion symbols and then further exercise power over the freedom of 
women’s and even men’s lives. The same question, as this Article shows, looms 
large in the context of the Louboutin red sole trademark. When a fashion symbol 
evolves into a luxury brand shielded by the giant red trademarked façade, it 
completely segregates the fancy world of luxury from the suffering world of 
poverty. 
When the “Christian Louboutin” word mark is already protected as a luxury 
brand, is it necessary to increase this protection with the additional boost of the red 
sole trademark? As argued by the article, social justice should be considered in 
responding to this question. Yet, the Louboutin courts turned a blind eye to the 
social justice issues embedded in the red sole mark analysis. To correct the 
Louboutin court’s approach, this article proposes that a social justice mandate 
should be incorporated into the judiciary’s future application of the secondary 
meaning doctrine that assesses whether a descriptive symbol is ultimately 
trademarkable. 
The social justice mandate, by its nature, would prevent any trademark 
owner from monopolizing some elements that are basic ingredients for the fashion 
industry and other industries as well. It would permanently block the floodgate that 
was created by the red sole trademark to allow the registration of red collars, red 
cuffs, and red CNN website stripe as trademarks, if they are exclusively marketed 
by a luxury company to acquire requisite secondary meaning. This would protect 
the poor from being swept away from the ordinary fashion trends that they are 
entitled to participate in. Simple things like red soles, collars, and cuffs should 
belong to the people of both Wall Street and Main Street. Both designers of fashion 
products247 and the trademark system should embrace this principle for the 
betterment of society.  
                                                                                                                                        
concept of femininity.”); see also TORIL MOI, SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR: THE MAKING OF AN 
INTELLECTUAL WOMAN 210 (Oxford University Press, 2d ed. 2008) (1994) (pointing out that de 
Beauvoir discovered fact that “'[F]emininity becomes an external set of rules for how to dress, 
behave, etc. . . . . .”). 
247 Vogue magazine’s report on Valentino, a legendary fashion designer, exemplifies the use 
of red as a basic element in the fashion industry. The report notes that “[o]n a visit to Barcelona, 
an opera-goer in a red velvet dress makes a lasting impression. ‘She was unique, isolated, fiery—
the perfect heroine,’ [Valentino] will later recall. ‘I told myself that if I were ever going to 
become a designer, I would do lots of red.’” Valentino, supra note 222. 
